

# UNITY OF EFFORT IN PEACE OPERATIONS

A Monograph  
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Military Intelligence



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## ABSTRACT

Unity of Effort in Peace Operations, Major Thomas F. Greco, USA, 82 pages.

This monograph maintains that the military is only one part of the peace operations environment, and not always the centerpiece. In addition, peace operations occur simultaneously at the tactical, operational and strategic level. This holds true for military, diplomatic, economic, informational and political components.

Unity of effort can be achieved by the military working in cooperation with the other pillars of the peace operations environment. These other pillars include military allies, Non-Governmental Organizations (NGO's), the United Nations (UN), parties to the conflict, politicians, media, influential visitors, and regional powers. To achieve unity of effort, and success in peace operations, the military must change its approach. This change entails looking at more than just military considerations. By using a non-military approach, in this case Peter Senge's model of systems thinking and the learning organization, the military will be better prepared for the challenges of peace operations.

A good way to achieve unity of effort is to use the Civil Military Operations Center (CMOC), but that is not enough. Liaison is also helpful. In order to make the CMOC and liaison work, a commander must augment these efforts with interpersonal relationships with his colleagues and frequent formal and informal meetings. A commander must constantly revise the mental models he holds for the non-military pillars in a peace operation. There is much that can be learned from other pillars, they hold the keys to branches and sequels since every pillar of a peace operation contributes to the operation's maturity. Mission creep is a poor excuse for an inability to identify branches and sequels to plans. If one only looks at the military component, one will miss indicators of changes in the overall environment that will affect military operations. If one understands the entire peace operations environment, one can understand how to identify branches and sequels before they occur. One needs the help of other pillars to understand the environment, for both situational and systemic awareness.

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No soldier ever accomplishes anything alone.

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## Chapter One: Introduction

Perhaps the most often used and inaccurate quote on peace operations is ascribed to Dag Hammerskold who said: "Peacekeeping is not a job for soldiers but only a soldier can do it."

Why is peacekeeping not a job for soldiers? Typically this is true because soldiers, especially America's, are trained to use overwhelming force to defeat enemies in conventional warfare. Certainly a tactical commander would be more comfortable with clear objectives in an uncluttered battlefield denuded of the non-combatants, and the resultant limitations and restraints. Unfortunately, tactical commanders will rarely face this situation. Likely, a commander will have unclear objectives and restrictive Rules of Engagement (ROE); in an area of operations cluttered by media, humanitarian and many other organizations; and his actions at the tactical level will have dramatic strategic impacts. Welcome to the world of peace operations.

Hammerskold may have been right, this complex environment is no place for a simple soldier. Now a commander must be part media star, part humanitarian, part diplomat, part strategist, and, if American, full time force protector. What can train a middle age man (or woman) to switch from coordinating fires which deal death and destruction, to keeping the peace or protecting shipments of food, clothing medicine and shelter? It is unlikely that anything in a commander's military training has prepared him for these diverse missions. How can a commander learn to deal with so many tasks that are outside the military comfort zone? Perhaps we can arm our commanders with a new way of looking at diverse operations. Rather than dictating how to act, commanders must know how to think. The way a commander will have to think will be less as a military man, but increasingly more like a diplomat, a humanitarian, and a

strategist. The key to looking at this not solely martial world may be with civilian techniques.

This paper applies a popular, contemporary, civilian leadership management theory to peace operations in order to deal with the complexity of tasks levied on military commanders.

This monograph applies the theories of Peter M. Senge to achieving unity of effort in peace operations.<sup>1</sup> Senge's work The Fifth Discipline: The Art and Practice of The Learning Organization, has created great interest in the United States Army as means to better prepare, intellectually, for the uncertainties of the twenty-first century. The Army is increasingly more involved in peace operations; a trend not likely to abate. The **systems thinking** approach Senge describes is a useful tool in dealing with the complexity of peace operations. This monograph assists leaders in gaining a better understanding of the peace operations environment through the use of Senge's models. That is, the Army as a **learning organization** can be more successful in peace operations.<sup>2</sup> Armed with the understanding of peace operations that being in a **learning organization** can provide, tactical commanders will be better prepared to achieve unity of effort.

Success in achieving unity of effort requires a commander to manifest the qualities of a leader of a **learning organization**. A **learning organization** operates very differently than the stereotypical, rigid, hierachal military system. In the stereotypical Army unit, the commander gives a mission to subordinates, and the subordinates allocate assets based upon Mission, Enemy, Terrain, Troops, and Time (METT-T) to accomplish the task. In a **learning organization** things are different. Members of a **learning organization** seek constant growth, and through teamwork, are able to reach their potential; this is similar to a high performance Army unit. In a **learning organization**, subordinates buy into a shared vision of success and use systems and intellectual leverage to achieve success. In the Army, the shared vision is often

dictated from higher to lower, not achieved through dialogue. Similarly, in a peace operation things are different than war. In peace operations commanders at every echelon must realize that there are limits that extend beyond METT-T and friction. Further, in peace operations, there are many factors in the root cause of the conflict that transcend the military. The root causes to a conflict that spawns a peace operation must be addressed and are rarely comprehensively military. Rather, military action is symptomatic of frustration of some other variables. Military action is only one component of a comprehensive solution, and it is not likely to be the preeminent force to achieve a lasting settlement.

Those who have taken part in UN peacekeeping operations are well aware of the limitations of the military in many of the capacities in which they are required to act; and; recognize that there are other civilian organizations better equipped mentally and by training to fulfill them instead.<sup>3</sup>

Thus, the military cannot legitimately expect to direct the efforts of other agencies when other agencies are better suited to fulfill certain roles. This lack of control over other agencies is even more troublesome because many non-military elements do not manage by objectives; or plan, prepare and execute as the military does. One can further explain the notion that the military may not be the best equipped to run peace operations by looking at the concept of key forces espoused by the controversial American air theorist John Warden.

Warden maintains that in crafting a campaign plan each of the service arms; land, sea and air; will not contribute equally to the success of a given mission. There must be one arm that, by the nature of its capabilities and what is to be accomplished, will dominate the operation.<sup>4</sup> If we extend Warden's concept of key forces to peace operations, the military may not be the best arm to resolve problems. Humanitarians, politicians, diplomats, industrialists,

religious leaders, or others may have more appropriate assets and expertise at their disposal than the military commander. It is incumbent on the military commander at the tactical level to understand the key forces (other agencies) in the area in which he is operating. (The area in which he is operating is not "his" area of operation. The area may belong to someone else. This is somewhat difficult for some in the military to understand since given a map and graphics a commander may feel a sense of governorship.) Beyond recognizing the key forces, the commander must also understand that other forces have organizational practices and hierarchies that differ from the military's. The military must learn to understand these other organizations and how they operate as systems.


Senge maintains that one of the hardest traits of the **learning organization** for western managers to comprehend is the absence of goals or destinations. Rather than being the director who is 'in control,' the leader of a **learning organization** needs to understand five disciplines: **shared (not imposed) visions, personal mastery , mental models, team learning, and systems thinking.**<sup>5</sup> By understanding how these five disciplines apply to peace operations, we can better achieve unity of effort working together with our counterparts, not directing them.

The idea of not being in control; or worse, no one in control, requires negotiation to arrive at solutions. This is not a comfortable environment for some in the military. Henry Kissinger noted, "A man who has been used to command finds it almost impossible to learn to negotiate, because negotiation is an admission of finite power."<sup>6</sup> The **five disciplines** described by Senge can be especially difficult for soldiers who were raised by the old Army adage: "Someone is always in charge." However, by looking at peace operations through the prism of **systems thinking**, with the eye of a **learning organization**, unity of effort becomes plausible.

Tactical commanders have to interact with military and non-military elements in peace operations. Complex inter-relationships exist between what humanitarian experts Larry Minear and Thomas G. Weiss termed the institutional pillars. Weiss and Minear's pillars are: the various United Nations (UN) organizations, outside governments who influence the situation like coalition partners, Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs), the host government, insurgents

(belligerent parties, warring factions, or armed opposition), peoples organizations (political, religious, ethnic), the media, and regional bodies.<sup>7</sup>

(Throughout this monograph the term "pillars" will reflect the institutions listed above.) Each of these pillars conjure images in the mind of the tactical commander. These pre-conceived notions are



UN, NGOs, Red Cross, Military, Media, Host Nation, Diplomats, Factions, Regional Organizations, Allies  
figure 1

what Senge termed **mental models**.

"**Mental models** are deeply ingrained assumptions, generalizations, or even pictures or images that influence how we understand the world and how we take action."<sup>8</sup> How the commander views the other pillars in a peace operation will dictate his behavior towards the other pillars. Later in this paper the **mental models** of many of these pillars are described more fully. These descriptions will help raise the tactical commander's consciousness on the capabilities and limitations of the other pillars. Once understood, the commander can manipulate these **mental models** to fit the systems confines of his operation. By shaping and constantly revising **mental models**, commanders will be able to better predict and fashion

system interaction. **Mental models**, especially their frequent revisions, will be necessary to comprehend the other pillars in the discussion of the remaining disciplines.

The second discipline is **personal mastery**, or the skill of continually clarifying and deepening one's understanding.<sup>9</sup> In military terms **personal mastery** has two critical components: continually clarifying what is important - mission focus, and continually learning how to see the current reality more clearly - situational awareness.

Mission focus is a dynamic entity. Missions may change faster than mandates and ROE. **Personal mastery** of the systems and problems in peace operations is a prerequisite for success. It is more than accomplishing tasks, or achieving objectives. **Personal mastery** entails creative tension which is the ability to clearly understand where the commander is in space and time and then purposefully manipulating reality to his vision.<sup>10</sup>

A tactical commander must have an objective situational awareness, this is how systems are in space and time. Then, he must manipulate the systems to enable him to achieve his desired end state. Systems set the environment which drive individual and group behavior. Only by establishing systems that facilitate success can a commander achieve his vision.

**Vision** is a picture of what the commander hopes to create. It is a means to bind others together for the common good. **Vision** provides an objective for aspirations which commanders can use to tie the other pillars to what they will conceive to be an important undertaking. It is rooted in the commander's own ability to visualize how he wants the environment organized, and achieved by solving problems with the end state in mind.<sup>11</sup> Unfortunately, not all the elements of each of the pillars of a peace operation will share the **common vision** of success. In fact, some pillars, like opposition parties or armed factions, may have a **vision** completely opposite to

that of the commander. These pillars who are working at cross purposes with the commander are beyond the scope of Senge's model of commitment to a **vision**. Senge assumes a uniformity of objective that does not exist in peace operations. However, the support of all the pillars may not be essential to mission success. Rather, a commander should focus on achieving unity of effort with those elements that are required to achieve his **vision**, and shape the behavior of potential opponents. This is a further manifestation of Warden's concept of key forces.

At any given time in an operation, the level of commitment of any of the pillars to the tactical commander's **vision** will vary. What the commander must do is insure that he has created a system that will insure compliance from the other pillars when required. One of the goals of unity of effort ought to be achieving a high level of commitment by key pillars to the commander's **vision**. The key pillars are those who are necessary for achievement of the **vision**, and those whose absence could have adverse repercussions later if not included. Likewise, the commander, since he is not in charge, has a reciprocal responsibility to be committed to the success of his colleagues's **visions**. This does not necessarily mean that the **visions** are the same, or even overlapping. Rather, the commander may have to allocate some of his assets inefficiently as an investment to earn commitment of another pillar. The commander must, however, maintain his will to achieve his **vision** despite the diverse **visions** of the other pillars, to be successful. Will and cooperation do not have to be mutually exclusive. However, if a commander applies will only for his advantage he will lose unity of effort. Loss of unity of effort can lead to unforeseen requirements and unanticipated predicaments.

Will is an important ingredient in a commander attaining his **vision**. However, a commander, while in his relentlessness to reach his **vision**, must not insure his success at the

expense of other agencies. In war, a commander must seek to position his forces for success. In this case will has a time tested definition:

... the quality which, together with the mental ability to understand what is needed, enables the commander to bend events in conformity with his plan . . . where such shaping of circumstances is infeasible, to ensure for his command every possible advantage which can be obtained.<sup>12</sup>

Likewise, in a **learning organization** a commander must bend reality to his **vision** (or into conformity with his plan), but he cannot strive to achieve an advantage for his forces alone. In peace operations, military success is tied to the success of the other pillars. Will must be in the form of relentless pursuit of a **shared vision**. A **shared vision** is a prerequisite for success.

**Team learning** is the fourth discipline. It is a process by which the capabilities of members of the group are greater than the sum of the capabilities of the individual members. Success in developing **team learning** skills comes through dialogue. **Team learning** is based upon mutual coordinated action, the ability to understand complex issues, and not tolerating behaviors that would minimize team development. **Team learning** can be difficult to achieve as the quote below indicates:

The complicating subtlety in all this is that many of the institutional players really don't like or trust each other. The PVOs (Private Voluntary Agencies) quarrel quietly among themselves, publicly with the UN. The UN does not often deal with the ICRC (International Committee of the Red Cross), which keeps to itself and protects its prerogatives. Much of this distrust is understandable-it results from ambiguous or overlapping organizational mandates; the stresses of working in combat where relief workers regularly get killed, wounded or kidnapped; competition for scarce private or donor government resources; lack of experience in dealing with each other; and turf issues over geographic and sectoral focus. . . . Perhaps the most consistently difficult lesson for US military forces to learn is that unlike their role in combat, they are not in charge of managing the response to a complex humanitarian emergency. . . . The unfortunate reality is that usually no one is in charge in a complex humanitarian emergency, a situation which is unlikely to change at any point in the foreseeable future. . . . In such a vacuum the military, trained to deal with chaos, can be perceived to be

usurping the prerogatives of other agencies. Training and practice can overcome such misperceptions.<sup>13</sup>

If team members are suspicious of each other, and resent a tactical commander's initiative, **team learning** will be difficult to achieve. This is especially true given the chaos of a complex situation like peace operations. Dialogue is the first step in diminishing fears and defusing tensions.

There are several ways for the tactical a commander to stimulate this dialogue. The over-reliance on military solutions is predicated on the perceived preeminence of the military and the use of force not negotiation. This ignorance of the true state of affairs hampers mutual understanding, and it is antithetical to many of the other pillars's techniques. Holding inaccurate **mental models** of the other pillars not only stands in the way of **team learning**, but can inhibit even required coordination. The arrogance of bearing arms and representing the remaining superpower can breed contempt and envy, hardly inducements to dialogue. The US military with its limited number of linguists and regional experts is at a distinct disadvantage in trying to establish dialogue. Further, military units are normally deployed for a set duration in an expeditionary nature. The other pillars may have arrived before, and will remain long after the military have returned to home station. The military must look to these other pillars for expertise on the situation, especially those aspects of the environment beyond the scope of the military's current mandate. Only by tapping the knowledge of these other pillars, and sharing expertise can dialogue be established. Dialogue is a key to unity of effort and mission success; without which, a commander limits his early warning capability.

Finally, **systems thinking** is the fifth discipline. "Systems thinking is a conceptual framework, a body of knowledge and tools that has been developed . . . , to make the full patterns clearer, and to help us see how to change them (patterns) effectively."<sup>14</sup> Systems thinking requires seeing interrelationships, moving beyond blaming others, understanding complexity, focusing efforts at the point where they will make the most impact, and avoiding solutions that only address symptoms and not conclusive solutions.<sup>15</sup> In other words, human interaction consists not of isolated causes and effects. Rather, many events and elements are related in time and space as a system. Each entity has an impact on the others. While the military itself is a system of systems,<sup>16</sup> it is only one (and often a minor one) of the systems in a peace operations system. By understanding system interrelationships, the tactical commander can derive important early warning of trends. These trends, of which he might otherwise not be aware, could dramatically affect his mission. A commander will be more successful in anticipating changes in his operational missions and his operational environment if he works with other agencies. If he looks solely on those issues that affect the military, he will ignore second order effects from issues originating from non-military issues that will eventually affect his command.

To illustrate this point, imagine the media has publicized a lack of drinking water in a refugee camp run by a humanitarian organization, and the US military in the area has no mandated requirements to that camp. If the commander ignores the refugee camp since it is not part of his military mandate, he will be caught unaware of the water crisis. Because of the shortage of water there is a highly televised riot in the camp. The national command authorities, at the request of the aid agency and with domestic pressure, then direct the military to quell the

riots. If the commander had been in contact with the aid agency, because it is a pillar in the overall system of the peace operation, the commander would have been aware that the water supply was a potential problem and beyond the scope of what the humanitarian agency could handle. Now the military sees its mandate creep to a non-mandated constabulary function: quell a riot. So "mission creep" could have been averted by lateral cooperation and taking action before the need for water caused violence. First comes the symptomatic fix: stop the riot and provide some water trailers. Next, the systems fix, help establish a self supporting permanent water source. This may require training the refugees (or host country personnel) on running donated water purification equipment, or teaching the refugees (or the host country government) how to dig wells, etc. The goal must be self sufficiency. The preemptive systems fix would have been for some element of the military force to have networked with the aid agency and established a **shared vision** of how the military and the humanitarian agency could have co-operated to make the camp self sufficient before the situation became a crisis.

To say that the military can not anticipate changes in its mission is to deny that branches and sequels to a plan have preliminary indicators. Most, if not all, crises have some indicator. It is short sighted to look only at the military system. If a commander fails to look at the other (non-military) systems, mission creep will occur, and the commander in hindsight will have been negligent for failing to understand his operational environment. The commander has several tools to help him look at the other systems in peace operations, the Civil Military Operations Center (CMOC), liaison officers, routine meetings, networking and social events. These tools will be discussed in more detail later. Achieving unity of effort lends itself to examination with Senge's principles due to the complex systems and other **learning disabilities** exhibited by the

Army and the other pillars found in peace operations. Each of these aspects of Senge's model will be discussed in the following chapters.

Senge has identified several systemic weaknesses that inhibit organizations from learning and realizing their full potential. These **learning disabilities** will be described within the model of the **five disciplines** described above. Recommendations on making peace operations more successful by mastering Senge's techniques are discussed throughout the monograph. The most important of these observations and recommendations are summarized in Chapter Three.

Appendix A discusses in detail the **learning disabilities** of Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs), especially the Red Cross; the UN; and the US Department of State. Chapter Two discusses the seven most common **learning disabilities** found in peace operations.

## Chapter Two: Mental Models and Learning Disabilities

As discussed earlier, **mental models** are important because they shape the way a commander views the other pillars of a peace operation. These preconceptions must be constantly updated in order for the commander to act appropriately. For example, imagine a commander has a preconception that one of his platoon leaders is weak because the platoon performs poorly. The commander may likely assign a strong platoon sergeant to train the lieutenant and take other measures to compensate for the young officer's weaknesses. (The commander is taking a **systems approach** by helping to shape the environment by not fixating solely on the lieutenant.) The commander will monitor the development of the lieutenant. If the platoon leader improves, the commander's **mental model** will change and the platoon leader will be treated differently. If the young officer does not improve, the commander's earlier conceived model will be reinforced and the commander will have to further modify the environment. Relief of the young officer is a form of modifying the environment, but that is not the **systems thinking** approach. The systems approach would be to look at the missions the platoon was asked to perform, and personnel issues like turbulence and personality conflicts. The commander should also observe if actions taken to "help" the young officer actually provided him a crutch retarding development. Finally, the commander should insure that he did not expect instant results. There is always a delay in making changes. (Water does not boil the second heat is applied.) Generally, these considerations are common sense to a commander. A commander can see from this that he can modify the environment of a unit he controls; he can direct changes to shape the environment.

By extension a commander can see how he can modify the environment to compensate for an attachment that is not directly subordinate (like aviation, special forces, engineers, or others not under his command operating in his area) based upon a **mental model** of the attachment. The commander does not have complete control over an attachment's environment as he does with a subordinate. The commander does have great leverage over an attachment by virtue of rank, or by elevating problems to a common commander at a higher level. More likely, the commander will try to solve the problem at his level by compensating for weakeners and strengths of his attachments. Despite lacking total command, the commander leverages the environment for success based upon a **mental model**. The antithesis of subordinates and friendly attachments is the enemy.

Unlike friendly forces, the enemy works against the commander at all times. The commander's estimate must include a **model** of the enemy with predictions on how the enemy will act. From this **mental model**, the commander determines how to shape the battlefield environment to put the enemy at a disadvantage. So, while a commander has no control over the enemy, a commander can structure the environment to dictate behavior of even his enemy.

Thus, there is thesis: a commander can shape the environment and the behavior of his subordinates and attachments. There is antithesis: the commander can shape the battlefield to modify the behavior of his enemy. Then there is synthesis: if a commander can shape the behavior of his subordinates and enemy, why can't he shape the behavior of the other actors in a peace operation who are neither his subordinates nor the enemy, but somewhere in between? The answer can be found through **systems thinking** and **mental models** used to overcome **learning disabilities**. This chapter discusses six **learning disabilities** found in peace operations

and how **systems thinking** can overcome these problems. **Mental models** are used throughout this chapter to assist commanders in applying solutions in the field. The first **learning disabilities** discussed are: **I am my position** and **the enemy is out there**. These two disabilities are closely related because they propagate insular bureaucratic practices that work contrary to the achievement of unity of effort. Next, this chapter examines the **learning disabilities**: **the illusion of taking charge, the fixation on events, and the delusion of learning from experience**. These are examined together to further explain how effective operational cooperation is inhibited when one of the pillars of a peace operation fails to understand how his actions affect the other pillars. This inter-relationship between pillars transcends the strategic, operational, and tactical levels. The boundaries between each of these levels of operation, and each of the pillars, become blurred in peace operations. Finally, this chapter describes the **myth of the management team**, and the similarities between coalition and peace operations.

The most common learning disability in a peace operation is what Senge called **I am my position**.<sup>17</sup> In this disability commanders, humanitarians, politicians, and others identify themselves solely as parts of their system. A commander will only see himself as a part of the military system, but not the military as part of the peace operations system. Similarly, a humanitarian may focus solely on distribution of aid and not on the need for long standing institutional development. This can be extended to any of the pillars of a peace operation. A commander may know that he is not alone, but he must understand that his military actions have an impact on aid workers, coalition partners, the host nation and every other pillar to some degree. For example, innocent aid workers who have worked diligently to avoid association

with the military can still be tainted by the actions of military personnel.<sup>18</sup> Commanders must understand that in peace operations you can not look solely at the military aspects of a problem.

The idea that the military is part of a whole works contrary to the way the US military pursued operations in Haiti. In Haiti, the Army's elite 10th Mountain Division followed a traditional military only approach that would not "... let 'Humanitarian' Mission get into 'Warfighting' Planning." The **mental model** used by the 10th Mountain Division was "If military force is sent ... there must be a reason ... work worst case scenarios."<sup>19</sup> Given this segmented **mental model**, unity of effort would be difficult to conceive, much less achieve. A less extreme **mental model** would be to recognize the true nature of the military instrument and the peace operations environment.

Military forces are blunt instruments. Peace operations involve subtle missions. This fundamental mismatch between the classic functions of military force and those required for successful peace operations makes careful design of command arrangements an essential step if effectiveness is to be achieved.<sup>20</sup>

This quote would be a more accurate example of a systemic observation if the word command were replaced by cooperation. "Command" here relates internally to the military, but is equally applicable to cooperation beyond the military. If one accepts the concept of **systems thinking**, the military and the other aspects of the peace operation are inextricably interconnected. As was discussed in Chapter One, the military can not by itself provide a comprehensive, lasting solution. It is part of a systemic solution. It is the military's **I am my position** disability that contributes to the endlessness of many current peace operations. To break the cycle of interminable peace operations, the military must look at the peace operations system.

Closely related to **I am my position**, is **the enemy is out there**. In **the enemy is out there**, problems are always the result of failures by other agencies.<sup>21</sup> This exists internal and external to military units. Examples of how this disability manifests itself are the old adages of "the (so and so's) at platoon headquarters" or the typical complaint by subordinate commanders that "the staff fouled up." Add to the insular nature of military units discussed above, the limitations of the military in providing comprehensive solutions and the appearance and the requirement to cooperate with many non military agencies; the results are that finger pointing and mutual disdain can get in the way of success. The way to over come these **disabilities** is to recognize that no one is to blame. Rather, success is tied to unleashing our **mental models** and looking at peace operations as a system. Andrew Natsios wrote:

Success in such operations will be determined by the degree to which all of the players can step outside of their individual cultures and value systems, surrender some of their autonomy, and seek the best rather than the worst, in those with whom they must solve the problems they will confront in a humanitarian emergency. Planning training, exercises, application of operational lessons learned-all can contribute to improved understanding and eventually improved execution of relief responses where millions of lives are at risk.<sup>22</sup>

All of the pillars of a peace operation must, "step outside of their individual cultures." By doing so the military can play an effective role in developing long lasting solutions to peace operations.

The military is not the only pillar that has problems both internally and with other pillars. The United Nations, the Red Cross, and the US inter agency effort all suffer from these first two **learning disabilities** to some degree. The way these **learning disabilities** manifest themselves in these institutions will be discussed in the appendix. This appendix looks at the **mental models** for the UN, NGOs, the Red Cross, and the Department of State; and how the first two

**learning disabilities** apply to these activities and their relations with the US military. In order to overcome the barriers between these institutions and to fashion systems that will insure success, commanders must go beyond the CMOC and liaison and establish interpersonal rapproches to develop a **shared vision**.

The CMOC is "a field office or coordination center responsible for interfacing US forces with various government, international, nongovernmental and private volunteer organizations."<sup>23</sup> The CMOC concept received its first test in response to Operation Provide Comfort, where Army Reserve civil affairs personnel activated for the Gulf War were diverted to northern Iraq. In northern Iraq, the civil affairs officers worked with the Turkish government, the State Department, USAID, NGOs, the UNHCR as well as the various Kurdish factions, as well as the Iraqi military. The Civil Affairs effort was successful owing to the remoteness of the region, respect for all parties concerned, and the military's singular capability to overcome the limits imposed by the geography and weather of the region. In Somalia the CMOC was also used as a clearing house for information and to coordinate the efforts of those entities that would accept cooperation. In Haiti, two CMOCs had to be established: one within the confines of an area secured by the military, the other in what was perceived as a civilian area (USAID headquarters). The reason two CMOCs were needed was to encourage cooperation by those NGOs that wished to avoid the taint of being involved with the military. Despite this effort, there were still NGOs

that would not participate in the CMOC effort. It is important for commanders to understand that not all NGOs will work with the CMOC. It may not even be necessary for all NGOs to work with the military. However, the military must know what NGOs are in the area and what they are doing, whether or not the NGOs are key forces to the success of a comprehensive solution.

The military tends to view the CMOC as the center piece of interagency cooperation. This is only true to a point. In the JTF Commanders Handbook, the CMOC is depicted as the center circle with several other intertwined circles overlapping it. In an After Action Report (AAR) from the Joint Readiness Training Center (JRTC), the representatives of several non military entities used the same graphic. However, in the JRTC AAR the center circle is blank, not the CMOC.<sup>24</sup>

Putting the CMOC into the center gives it too much precedence over the other pillars who wish to be seen as partners. This difference is especially noteworthy because the non military agencies represented had agreed to participate in the JRTC exercise, and thus are less adverse to participating with the military than many other NGOs. If this group of cooperative non military pillars do not view the CMOC as sole the center piece of coordination, the military must expect more dissenting pillars to be even less likely to see the CMOC as the military does. Thus the **mental model** of the CMOC should be a place where some pillars of a peace operation will come to coordinate with the military. It is not a panacea, only a part of a multi disciplined effort to achieve cooperation.




figure 2

If an NGO is a key force and will not cooperate in the CMOC effort, the commander must take an active effort in establishing dialogue. This dialogue can be established by liaison, social calls, or through intermediaries. If the NGO is not a key force, and does not wish to cooperate in the CMOC effort, the commander still needs to know what the NGO is doing. This knowledge is not needed to control the NGO; rather, to help the commander identify if the efforts of the NGO can have an unintended influence on military operations. Many NGOs will not chose to participate in the CMOC effort, preferring to stay independent. Another means to gain cooperation is liaison. Counter intelligence and special forces personnel have special training in developing a rapport and can gather information. The use of artillerymen as liaison was successful in both Somalia and in Haiti by the 10th Mountain Division.<sup>25</sup>

In Somalia and in Haiti, the Division Artillery was used to augment the liaison effort. Because the Artillery has robust communications and superior mobility, it was a logical choice to serve as the commander's liaison element. Using the artillery in this ingenious way broke down information stovepipes that exist within the other pillars in the peace operations, and served as a directed telescope for the division commander. The use of the artillery in this manner was not tied to a lack of a threat requiring fires. It enhanced targeting by providing good target detection capabilities. Because the artillery was organized as a liaison effort with the coalition forces, the US Army Rangers were able to be relieved.<sup>26</sup> Though only briefly mentioned in US Army doctrine, and not resourced in authorization documents, the use of liaison officers can pay big dividends. The US Army Center for Army Lessons Learned (CALL) has several recommendations for effective liaison. These serve to make liaison more effective, but each operational environment requires independent evaluation of liaison needs:

Commanders should be prepared to establish LO with belligerent forces, relief agencies, host nation government, local political groups, as well as adjacent and higher HQ. Liaison officers serve as an immediate channel of communication to effect operations that may impact on combined operation throughout the theater of operations. Individuals who serve as liaison officers should be of high quality and sufficient rank and authority appropriate to their level of liaison. Liaison Officers must:

- be identified early.
- function as directed by the commander that sent them.
- know the limitations and capabilities of the unit they are with and they are from.
- must have constant communication with sending and receiving unit.
- must have redundant communication to the sending unit.
- must have enough personnel for 24 hour operations.
- must be able to conduct rapid staff estimates.
- must be language trained or have linguists with them.<sup>27</sup>

Liaison officers can help to start dialogues, but they may be resented because they represent something akin to a military salesmen selling the military machine.

One way to demystify and humanize the military machine is to include NGOs in social affairs (Thanksgiving at the mess hall, 4th of July celebrations, etc).

At the lowest level, where their actions have the greatest impact, military commanders can offer inducements for NGO cooperation. Meetings held in mess halls at lunchtime, informal lessons in combat first aid or vehicle maintenance, and 'happy hours' have all been used successfully at unit level to encourage NGO participation in coordination meetings.<sup>28</sup>

The social rapport is a part of professional networking. A peace operations force commander ought to deploy with representational funds for networking in the same way diplomats and flag officers entertain. There is an expectation that US forces can entertain, other nations sponsor informal and formal social events. These foster good will and cooperation.

The next **learning disabilities** to be discussed will be, **the illusion of taking charge**, the **fixation on events**, and **the delusion of learning from experience**. **The illusion of taking charge** is when pro-activeness is confused with reactivity. Problems can not be solved by

simply being more active. Problems can only be solved by understanding the root causes of the problems and identifying how we contribute to our own problems. The **fixation on events** focuses on the short term fix rather than the long term solutions. The media plays an important role in fixing our attention on symptoms rather than on the root causes of the disease. The media also plays a role in our **delusion of learning from experience**. The **delusion of learning from experience**, means that we never experience the consequences of our decisions. These **learning disabilities** will be described within the context of the media, information stovepipes, and long range versus short range planning.

It is especially hard for the military to accept that there is an **illusion of taking charge**. In the military someone is always in charge. However, in the complex environment of peace operations, no one may be in charge, and many pillars like it that way. For the US military, this is particularly irksome due to the pressures leveled on the military by the media, VIPs and the military's perceived need for public support. Not all nations are as anxious as the US to be in charge and to try to shape the efforts of the other pillars. These are the nations that have made up the bulk of peacekeeping missions, and will temper the expectation of the US military.

They will tend to approach some issues from a different vantage point than their U.S. colleagues. Their professional expectations may be lower, but in some cases more realistic; their capability to achieve targets through consensus and compromise, of necessity, more keenly developed. Above all the UN veteran may understand better than his American colleague that it is sometimes more realistic to achieve a lesser objective at a slightly lower standard than to strive for the absolute solution. To some extent the weary cynicism of the UN veteran needs the energizing influence of an American approach, but there is also a need for a compromise that tempers the inclination for over achievement with a realism derived from hard-won experience.

McKinlay is only partially correct. Experienced peace keepers may have come to the understanding that there is an **illusion of taking charge** in a peace operation, but one can not

give up trying to shape the environment. While the US can no doubt learn from the Nordic nations, Canada, Ireland and other traditional peacekeeping nations, none of these nations possess the global capabilities and the resultant expectations of involvement levied on the United States. To helplessly accept frustration as being par for the course may be palatable in Dublin, Stockholm and Ottawa. It will never be acceptable in Washington, especially as long as the United States has to pay nearly one third of the costs, especially with the US media affecting our policy decisions.

US commanders may not be able to change the environment entirely, but with the aid of the media and visitors, it can help shape the policy that determines the cause of a peace operation.

The world is very susceptible to the manipulation of the media. Media coverage or lack of coverage shapes how the public, and policy makers will respond to crisis. The media does not cover all events and the events it does cover may not be covered in a balanced manner. Members of humanitarian organizations, subject like anyone else to the fluctuating moods and whims of their societies, are by the very nature of their task constantly faced with these problems-not only because they need the material and moral support of the public if they are to act freely and effectively, but also because the reactions of governments and the United Nations to major crises are inextricably bound up with public opinion, whether they try to keep pace with it or manipulate it to obtain its support. In practice these two processes go hand in hand, with synchronization following on from manipulation. There is no way to predict what crisis will capture the imagination enough to act upon.<sup>29</sup>

Shaping policy may require some efforts that are far removed from the normal considerations of the military. Some of the parties in a peace operation may go so far as to stage media spectacles. The thought that the US military would stage an event solely for publicity is somewhat unprofessional. A commander must tell the truth and have confidence that the media and the other pillars will give the truth the exposure necessary for ethical judgements to be made. A

commander should not engineer media events. He must know what an engineered event looks like or he may not be able to include the second order effects of a media event in his planning.

In order to engineer an international media event:

Pictures not words turn an incident into an event. The upheaval must be isolated if it is not to be ousted once and for all by a parallel conflict: a television news service cannot cover two famines at once. There must be a mediator - a personality or volunteer from a humanitarian organization to authenticate the victim, channel the emotion generated and provide both distance and a link between the spectator and the victim. Besides setting the scene, the victim must be acceptable to the audience in his or her own right.<sup>30</sup>

Beyond just reporting the news, the media has the ability to instantly bridge the gap from tactical to the strategic level. Commanders must be prepared for the impact of the images in the area of operation will have when placed on television screens in comfortable living rooms, plush conference rooms and frantic situation rooms around the world.

Peace operations occur simultaneously at the strategic, operational and tactical level. Military officers, normally not required to handle all three levels at the same time can find this complex arrangement difficult. Ernest Evans wrote that the military does not like having to handle all three levels at the same time.<sup>31</sup> This aversion is due in part to the US military's tradition of staying out of political matters.

The military is very circumspect in choosing which political matters it is willing to address. (For example, there was a great controversy when Collin Powell wrote an "Op Ed" article for the New York Times arguing against allowing "Gays" in the military.) This caution adds extra importance to the matters it chooses to discuss. The military, with a few visible exceptions, tends to avoid political issues and political activities. The military is structured by rank and protocol. In the military, decision making is like the legal process. Political decision

making is different, and is driven by considerations that are more pragmatic and less based on a proscribed code.<sup>32</sup> The military intimidates civilians, and controls policy informally despite being under civilian control.<sup>33</sup> This intimidation appears to be on the rise with the growing lack of military experience in America's civilian political leadership. The military hates disorder and gets frustrated by the disorder of politics.<sup>34</sup> But, the disorder of politics must be understood, but not directed; much the same way a commander must understand the disorder of a peace operation, while recognizing he may not be able to control it. Finally, the military does not like politics because it eats away at the officer corps professionalism.<sup>35</sup>

Those officers who have entered into political discourse while on active duty did so at the risk of being ostracized by their profession. Given the increasing complexity of issues surrounding peace operations; driven by the media, military considerations can not be separated from the diplomatic, economic, political and informational issues. Plus, with the growing ignorance in military matters in Washington, military leaders may have to become more vocal. Military leaders may have to learn to articulate how tactical events are political matters. Perhaps the "professional" silence of America's military leaders in the Viet Nam era was in fact disloyal and counterproductive, and should not be repeated in the next Bosnia, or the next Somalia, or the next Haiti. However, the connection between tactical events and political actions at the strategic level is neither unique to peace operations, nor is this a new dynamic. Gordon Craig maintains that one of the key principles Delbruck develops in his writings is the inter-relationship between political strategic ends manifested in tactical engagements.<sup>36</sup>

The strategic level deals with the ends sought by policy. The operational level addresses ways in which resources are mobilized and applied to achieve these ends. The tactical level

addresses the specific means to achieve objectives in pursuit of the overall strategy.<sup>37</sup> In a conference at Fort Leavenworth in 1994, representatives from many nations's militaries as well as several diplomats met to discuss achieving unity of effort. One significant finding was at the tactical level groups tended to work out agreements for cooperation. (Again, conference participants were already predisposed to cooperate with military as indicated by their presence at the conference sponsored by the military.) At the operational level they found relatively few structures to tie the strategic and tactical levels together. This absence of operational level structures dooms the tactical level to responsiveness not activity because it lacks a coherent vision from higher to translate into structures on the ground. Thus, efforts by the tactical commander to take charge and share his vision as derived from his operational level can easily be disrupted by the lack of equivalent, consistent nested concepts in the other pillars.

At the strategic level the UN has had difficulties mounting, managing and coordinating new missions; changes in the Department of Peacekeeping Operations which are now in progress may improve the situation. Policies and goals developed in New York are translated into force deployments and military tasks at force headquarters. This is the operational level, and it is here the conference found the greatest unresolved difficulties in inter-agency coordination. At the operational level the divergent means, different emphasis, and different organizational cultures of force headquarters, humanitarian organizations, political officers and national contingents are most likely to run afoul of each other-sometime creating new problems on top of those they are there to solve. . . . In contrast unit officers, NGO workers and local authorities in the field are often able to arrive at pragmatic solutions when they meet face to face at the tactical level.<sup>38</sup>

Senge would argue that trying to separate the strategic from the operational and the tactical would be like cutting an elephant into three pieces. You do not end up with three small elephants.<sup>39</sup> Each part of the elephant contributes to the overall entity, the elephant. Looking solely at one part of the elephant may not reveal the true composition of the animal just as looking only at one level of a peace operation does not reveal its true nature. Only by looking at

the elephant as a **system** is it understandable as an entity. Only by looking at a peace operation as an entire entity is it understandable as a **system**. When the military fails to connect the effects of that the three levels have on one another, it is guilty of **the learning disability delusion of learning from experience**. A commander who fails to understand that his efforts are part of a greater whole misses the true nature of **systems thinking**. Cycles are hard to see and the military at the tactical level is only one small contributor to the overall **system**. The military at all three levels is also only one contributor at each level and only a part of the overall whole.

Senge writes that **today's problems come from yesterday's solutions**.<sup>40</sup> By this, a commander faced with a problem will make a solution based on the situation on the ground. While this solution may work in the short term, the lack of nested concepts between all the key forces of the peace operation could mean that this quick fix will lead to greater problems in the future. This argues for the operational art or a well thought out campaign plan at the operational level that combines all the pillars that are key forces.

Personality driven solutions are not unique to the tactical level nor are they uniformly applicable at the tactical level. You can fail to have success at the tactical level and you can have success at the strategic and operational level based on personalities. At the operational level, the ability of senior officers from theater military headquarters have been able to develop personal rapport with strategic level leaders of the other pillars. The best way to insure that there are consistent nested concepts between all the pillars at every level is to establish structures for cross communication. Otherwise, successful coordination and execution is captive to the personalities of the leaders at the highest levels who are highly susceptible to media and other influences. Media have changed the focus from substance to form.

... finally the media have never played such an ambiguous role in humanitarian relief. Live TV coverage, as opposed to real needs, is now dictating the priorities of humanitarian operations. Prime time footage of the UNs 'humanitarian' intervention on Mogadishu beach allowed television cameras to gloss over the traps inherent in the hope-restoring operation. Similarly, the highly publicized rescue of Sarajevo's little Irma, while fooling no one about its public relations value, managed temporarily to obscure the realities of the relief situation in former Yugoslavia while forcing the United Nations to bend their criteria on medical evacuations.<sup>41</sup>

An Australian writer discussed the need to conduct marketing like operations to breed a successful perception. His view was to tell your story to shape perceptions since policy is so heavily influenced by perceptions.<sup>42</sup> A maneuver commander of a US peace operations force understood the value of marketing. He maintained figures and facts that shaped a good impression of what he was doing.<sup>43</sup> Senge says one resorts to the quantifiable if one does not understand the system. that drives our behavior.<sup>44</sup>

Quick, simple and yielding appeal with immediately visible results (at least in comparison with the political treatment of exotic problems) humanitarian action has the knack of showing itself in a form which is easy to understand and appreciate: the victim and his rescuer have become one of the totems of our age. . . . Man as Marx observed, only ever sets himself problems he is capable of resolving: television news only ever brings us emotional images we are capable of sublimating. . . . subject select themselves by a two stage process. First, the physical timing imposed by the length and pace of the broadcast . . . Second, the symbolic status of 'victim', which can in effect only be granted in cases of unjustified or innocent suffering.<sup>45</sup>

Quantifiables also lend themselves to sound bites which make things more understandable to the public since the media will only devote a limited amount of time to covering a story. The nature of humanitarian aid delivery, like many aspects of a peace operation, lends itself to measurable results.

There has been a great deal of vacillation on the part of policy makers in peace operations. The US, as the main contributor, is expected to provide strong leadership at the

highest levels. Unfortunately, this is not always the case. Failure to provide a consistent direction can send the wrong messages to parties, and will effect their behavior. US policies change based upon perceptions. It is important to insure that information is accurately reported in the Media, to the population of the host country, to the chain of command, and the entire community of peace operations pillars. Military commander must keep up with changes in the political situation caused by perceptions, it will influence the mission and could change guidance from higher before he has a chance to react, he must be able to anticipate the impact of appearances. US policy, needs to be steadier and must not be so susceptible to perceptions shaped by the media.<sup>46</sup> The US military is faced with the requirement to take action despite firm guidance from higher levels. The military, therefore must design its vision, sell it to the other pillars, and constantly conduct maintenance on the vision by working with the other pillars, especially the media and visitors (like Very Important Persons, VIPs).

Like the media, VIPs offer an opportunity to give your side of the operation. VIPs come in the form of senior military officers who help to shape the military pillar, or senior leaders from any of the other Pillars. VIPs also consist of senior policy makers (elected officials and their staffs). By preparing yourself, you can express concerns and help shape the issues. If you fail to use your access to VIPs, you miss out on having an opportunity to control the perceptions of the agencies they represent. These VIPs will walk away with **mental models** of the peace operation. It is up to the commander to insure that he helps to form accurate models in the mind of the visitors. Only with accurate models, based wholly on truth not marketing, can rational decisions be made. Political decision are not always rational in a military sense, but they too should be based on facts. Visits by VIPs will also make you conscious of the **vision** they hope

to share. This is good early warning and helps to shape a commander's **mental models and vision**. The concerns of VIPs can affect operations, and must be noted. A VIP visit allows the commander on the ground and the decision makers, or those who influence decision makers, to speak to each other unfettered by intermediaries. This dialogue is a great way to **share visions**. VIPs shape changes to missions by their impact on the peace operations system and sometimes by directly ordering changes to the military. Failure to understand the impact of VIPs on operations results in failing to identify branches and sequels.

By understanding what makes an impact in the media and VIPs, the commander on the ground can both avoid the body count like resorting to figures and instead focus on explaining the true phenomena that is occurring. This allows the commander on the ground to control the terms of the discussion rather than to be reacting to the media. The command information program is one way to understand how to educate the other pillars about an operation. The staff public affairs officer is an import part of this information campaign, but he is not alone. Every member of the command must be imbued with the objective of getting the truth out and getting it out accurately. There must be consistency in the message from all members of the command. All members must understand they play a role in how the mission will be perceived.

The State Department issues press guidance to diplomats on how to handle important issues. Many foreign governments pass this type of guidance to their military officers who are posted abroad so they know how to respond. But what is really needed and expected of a US military officer is the truth as he sees it. In every case a formal information campaign should be established. It may be necessary to wage an information campaign to get the truth out, but it must be the truth on the whole peace operations system, not just statistics. Commanders do not

take charge of a peace operations environment, they take part in it. Commanders do not control the media, they state their case to it. Commanders do not control events, but they can help shape the structure that result in certain behaviors.

In a peace operation a commander can not realistically strive to take the offensive.

Commanders seek to share their vision with the other pillars and identify which key forces are needed for success.

More importantly, however, this implies that they [peace operations forces] must seek to achieve adaptive control - to foresee the set of possible futures and take steps to influence the course of events so that unacceptable futures are prevented and desirable ones encouraged. Thinking about alternatives available to the enemies of peace and finding ways to structure the situation so that their interests and actions coincide with those seeking peace become very important. This can be as simple as ensuring observation, documentation, and media attention when peace terms are likely to be violated, or as complex as creating incentives for cooperation between groups with very different world views.<sup>47</sup>

By developing a **common vision** and instituting systems with the other pillars, commanders can cause behaviors that work to the common benefit. By not looking at events, but rather at the systems, the pillars of a peace operation can establish long lasting solutions. Unfortunately, commanders do not work with other pillars, the media can twist information to suit agendas, and VIPs are often **fixated on events**, reacting to the latest crisis.

Commanders often become **fixated on events** because they are forced to be reactive. In conventional war the enemy often can be readily identified. A readily identified enemy can be met with active measures to modify the environment and place the enemy at a disadvantage. In a peace operation, there ought to be an absence of a conventional enemy, but the environment can still be shaped to modify behavior. In peace enforcement there is a party (or parties) to the conflict who must be brought under control. However, using force can be counter productive to

the long term solution. Treating a belligerent party as an enemy in the classical form can be counter productive. Senge maintains that the harder we push the harder a system pushes back.<sup>48</sup> This is true of treating a pillar in a peace operation, including peace enforcement, as if he were an enemy in a conventional conflict.<sup>49</sup> So how do commanders react to problems in peace operations?

One US task force commander attempted to overcome problems by developing a **mental model** which stated, "The enemy is anyone who stands between me and accomplishing my mission." This model, though pithy, is filled with flaws. Peace operations are a dynamic environment. Pillars may have missions which conflict with military objectives and a given point, but not at others. If the military pillar does not have a **shared vision** with other pillars he may not be able to reconcile temporary conflicts in mission. Just as a commander will not win every engagement in a conventional war, a commander in a peace operation must be able to absorb temporary set backs when missions conflict, as long as they do not cause a terminal deviation from the overall **vision** of success. If a commander becomes adversarial each time his mission is at odds with that of his colleagues, he will be inconsistent and unreliable. If the shoe were on the other foot, no commander would want to deal with pillars who were only fair weather friends.

Before taking an action that would be at cross purposes with another pillar, a commander should apply the Suitability, Feasibility, and Acceptability tests. Suitability determines how completely the task would be to completion if the event were carried out successfully. Feasibility determines if the event is practicable, that it can be successful. Finally, and most importantly, acceptability determines the, ". . . evaluation of the diminution in total advantage

which will result in the event of failure, and a comparison of gains with losses in the event of success.<sup>50</sup> Normally, acceptability is a determination of mission effectiveness at the battle's end state. In peace operations, acceptability is a determination of the cooperative capital that remains in the commander's account if he sacrifices another pillar for his own gains. This comes from the theory of leadership developed by Stephen R. Covey, the author of The Seven Habits of Highly Effective People, and Principle Centered Leadership. He offers some worthwhile guidelines for commanders in peace operations which can overcome **the fixation on events**.

First, Covey warns commanders not to look for short term fixes. Rather, we should take the long view for success. Covey's seven habits: be proactive, begin with the end in mind, put first things first, think win - win, seek first to understand - then to be understood, synergize, and sharpen the saw;<sup>51</sup> are all consistent with the **systems thinking and learning organization** perspective offered by Senge. If a commander adapts Covey's seven habits, and commits himself to making the ethical choice at the time of decision, the commander will be more predictable and more successful in the long term. A commander must ask himself, is this short term gain important enough to risk the future cooperation of this pillar of the peace operation? Questions like this will lead the commander to think in the long term and establish structures that will prevent him from having to sacrifice his relations with other pillars. This is an important component in a **shared vision**.

The Nordic peace keepers have an adage, "Blue berets have no enemies and very few friends." **Shared visions** notwithstanding, it would be naive to believe that a military force in a peace operation will never have to take action that is contrary to the best interests of the other pillars. It would be even more naive to think that military forces will never have to use force.

The use of force is normally spelled out in the ROE and is guaranteed for self defense regardless of ROE. The military instrument may be used to compel other parties. In some of these instances there is in fact an enemy of the conventional sort, or one perhaps one that is more elusive.

John Jandora, in Parameters stated that there are five potential threat forces that may oppose the US military. These are regime forces, insurgent or factional forces, terrorists, criminal organizations and the armed populace. These groups all likely have an objective, leadership structure, tactics, weapons and a base of supply. He describes armed populace as militant mobs that are, despite appearances, unlikely to be random groupings. Unrelated groups of unemployed, underemployed, students, factory workers and others; may have a common resentment against the government or one of the other pillars of the peace operation. Criminal organizations can be pirates, poachers, smugglers, traffickers, or even businessmen. Their concern is continuing to make money and will act to protect business interests. Regime forces are those that are maintained by government. Factional forces are like regime forces but are held together to support a government. In order to meet these threats, "Planners will have to rely on other US governmental agencies, and perhaps, on foreign governmental and nongovernmental agencies for the information they seek. In many cases, protocols and procedures for information exchange will have to be established . . ."<sup>52</sup>

Armed factions will also exist in areas where the state system is breaking down (Bosnia) or no longer exists (Somalia). Some nation may have armed bands as their military (Some former Soviet republics). These armed bands are similar to the "New Warrior Class" described by Ralph Peters. The US military must be prepared to fight or deal with more warriors in the

near future than formal armies of soldiers maintained by states. The Army must maintain its ability to defeat trained, organized and disciplined armies, but it must also be prepared to fight warriors. In order to do this the Army needs to develop a data base on these warrior bands. We must get past bean counting and hardware acquisition and study human behavior and regional history. Unlike peace operations, fighting warriors is a zero sum game. All they understand is unequivocal strength. This complicates the military mission for three reasons, warriors may not be the enemy, warriors may be popular with large parts of the population , and commanders may have the mission to win over the population. Peters maintains that warriors must be broken and you can not compromise with them.<sup>53</sup> Not all warriors will operate under the rules of the Geneva Conventions.

For example, in Nagorno-Karabakh hostage taking has undergone a revival. Civilians, as well as military persons, are often taken to exchange for friends, family or comrades. Sometimes the kidnapings are conducted by professional 'dealers' who operate for profit. Under the Geneva conventions, non criminal civilian detainees must be released by beligerents and combatants held prisoner are subject to strict rules.<sup>54</sup> US military forces will have to prepare themselves for this barbarous behavior, yet not stoop to this low conduct.

Civilized prosecution of war should not be expected by the other parties in a peace operation. Preparing soldiers for this terror, yet insuring restraint, will be a challenge for commanders. So how do you work with warriors, as required by a peace operation, while earning their respect yet not becoming adversarial and yet not putting yourself at risk and antagonizing the warriors constituency? This is pretty difficult but the US is well positioned to do this; in fact only the US can. One needs to be constantly firm and display a huge retaliatory

capability, yet not deviate from ROE that protect the rights of civilians. Unlike police who also have this restriction, the US military has the ability to raise the stakes in an operation by the immediate application of immense combat power.<sup>55</sup> The marines early fire fight set an intimidating tone in relations with the Haitian police which the 10th Mountain Division never relaxed. Yet, this tone can be counter-productive.

In Haiti, the US Army considered the mission a force operation, that is an operation where there were hostile armed factions that posed a threat that only could be met by force. In this sense, the Haitian police were not unlike the new warrior class Peters described (fortunately the Haitian police had no constituency in Haiti to complicate matters). The US treated them as an entity that required intimidation and was able to bend the police to their will. Unfortunately, there were populations in Haiti that were not of this vein yet the US military still resorted to intimidation. Under a definition of the enemy is anyone who gets in the way of my accomplishing my mission, enemies could change every day. A consistent approach to the various pillars of the Haitian community could be constructed if the US had a long range campaign plan that included non-military pillars.

John Mackinlay wrote that US forces sometimes will be deployed in situations where fighters (or other threats like guerrillas) refuse to cooperate in the peace process. The population may be at risk of coercion or terror to try to sway it from support for the peace efforts. The military must provide a sense of security and constantly try to maintain the civilian support.<sup>56</sup> Senge would argue that by pushing to hard the system will respond even more negatively. If the military tries to hard to suppress the guerrilla forces, the guerrillas will gain in legitimacy. In order to appropriately defeat the threat posed by the fighters opposed to the peace effort, there

must be a multi-agency effort to create conditions where the fighters are considered renegades. This multi-agency effort is more than a security mission for the military, however. The security effort does not exist independent of the other nation building activities conducted by the other pillars. The effort must not attack the fighters coercion of the population, that is only a symptom. The effort must be focused deeper, on the root conditions that could spawn the fighters in the first place. This has a reciprocal value. Soldiers who have good relations with the local population will be the beneficiaries of assistance from civilians. It is a two way street. An important aspect of friendly force protection is promoted when the military forces show concern and effort to secure the local population.

The local population and the armed factions are only one part of the host nation pillar of a peace operation. Host nations can be mature, like Turkey in Operation Provide Promise, or Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro). Host nations can be immature, like Macedonia or Georgia. They can also have ceased to exist as states like Somalia and Rwanda. Regardless of the level of maturity of the host (or neighboring) governments, the pillars of a peace operation will normally try to use institutions that exist in order to minimize the artificiality of their third party involvement. In other words, US Aid will try to work with the ministries that run the economy or the clan elders who will operate projects. The level of maturity of the host nation and the host nation institutions will limit or guarantee access and security and other factors which will dictate how the pillars can operate.

Gaining access to the area of operations even in a benign environment requires approval of the host nation.. This is a fact US planners ignored when they assumed Kenya would allow air access to their staging bases for operations in Rwanda. With the US military less and less

forwardly deployed, the need for access to air heads and ports looms greater and should be coordinated as early as possible.<sup>57</sup> Even before entering into the area of operations, the behavior of the troops and the relations with the host government must be established, especially if no Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) exists. In the case of Turkey and operation Provide Comfort, the existing NATO SOFA proved inadequate. For UN forces and UN civilian personnel, their relationship with the host nation is spelled out in the SOFA, Participation Agreements and customary law.<sup>58</sup> Normally, soldiers and civilians on UN duty have special diplomatic immunities beyond those usually enjoyed by US soldiers overseas. Just the presence of a third party force intervening in the affairs of a host nation, or one of its neighbors can have effects US military planners may not expect:

... peacekeeping rests on the consent of the state or states on whose territory the peacekeepers operate. If any such operation is to maximize its contributions to the maintenance of peace, it must also have the co-operation of all relevant disputants, whether or not they happen to be host states'... it is the parties [to the conflict] who play the crucial role, not only in respect of success of a peacekeeping mission but also in its creation. ... [There are] three broad grounds on which parties may have reservations involving a peacekeeping body in their conflict: (1) a peacekeeping presence may have undesirable international repercussions, not just for the host(s) states, but for any non-host parties; (2) international consequences having an adverse effect on only the hosts; and (3) the domestic repercussions of having peacekeepers on one's soil. ... The host countries cooperation is essential, but when not fully available, as is often the case, it will not entirely jeopardize the operation. The degree of cooperation, or lack of it, will influence the impression of the host country on not only the contributing states, but on the other members of the international community ... In the second instance [peacekeepers highlight] the obvious need for a third party to cover a state's weakness ... this suggests a different type of inferiority, morale rather than physical ... besides ... [infringing on a states sovereignty somewhat] ... lastly, a peacekeeping operation would have an inevitable effect on domestic policies. It would involve relations with the populace and would affect national policies.<sup>59</sup>

The host nation, and its neighbors, are very complex systems over the military pillar has only limited authority, except when it is an occupying power. Normally, the military's rights and

responsibilities are covered in customary law. Unfortunately, situations like Somalia, and to a lesser degree, Bosnia, take the military pillar into uncharted territory through which ROE may not serve as an adequate guide. The other pillars are also have a wide range of new situations to manage since the host nation and its neighbors are their area of operation also, and they do not control the region with any greater legitimacy than the military. Given this complexity, structures like SOFAs, ROEs and other agreements must be flexible documents to provide frameworks and structures for behavior to prevent the **delusion of learning from experience**.

There is one last learning disability to be covered, the myth of the **management team**. In the **myth of the management team**, participants must function at the level of the lowest common denominator. Members of the team can neither achieve their individual potential, nor can they achieve the groups whole potential because they must scale back activities to compensate for inadequacies of group members.<sup>60</sup> This manifests itself in the interaction between the pillars of peace operations and between members of military coalitions.

Coalition operations will become increasingly more important to the US military as the draw down inhibits the ability of the United States act unilaterally due to insufficient forces. A symposium at the National Defense University studied coalition warfare and found that the reasons for forming a coalition are: to achieve greater legitimacy, for power aggregation and resource aggregation, and to serve as a restraint function. The cost of being in a coalition is that national objectives are submerged, diverted, or derailed in favor of the group's.<sup>61</sup> Many of the considerations noted for coalition operations are equally relevant to the work of regional bodies. (Examples of regional bodies include the European Union, the Association of South East Asian Nations - ASEAN, the Caribbean Community - CARICOM and the Organization of African

Unity - OAU. ) Regional bodies mirror the advantages and disadvantages of coalition operations. The costs of being part of a coalition or acting under the auspices of a regional body, are examples of **the myth of the management team**. To maximize the benefit of forming a coalition, the US needs to; lay the groundwork for future combined operations, identify a core group that will have the main burden, and once established conduct coalition maintenance (this includes conducting interagency coordination.<sup>62</sup> These techniques are the similar to those previously suggested for establishing unity of effort in peace operations. In order to improve coalitions the US needs to make coalition partners better by giving them equipment, training or intellectual capital. This is a method of raising the lowest common denominator, thus allowing the whole group to perform at a higher level. The US is at a disadvantage in coalition operation since it is short of Foreign Area Officers, linguists and technical specialist who speak languages or have experience in contingency regions.<sup>63</sup>

John Mackinlay wrote that the US military has some problems to overcome in facing future peace operations that are similar to the problems it faces in coalition operations. The US must determine what degree of command subordination it will allow US units under a multi-national UN headquarters. The US must address responsibilities for liaison and lateral communication within the mission. It must overcome language and procedural problems within the host country. The lack of agreed operating concepts and the need to develop a common modus operandi will be increased with coalition partners that are not members of NATO or use NATO procedures. One great difficulty to be overcome will be that of lateral coordination of effort between the civil and military elements of the force. Issues like the decision to develop unilateral or multi-lateral emergency evacuation plans and overcoming caveats on the use and

release of strategic intelligence will be difficult but necessary to overcome. Finally the US will have to determine whether to rely on UN or unilateral/national combat support arrangements.<sup>64</sup> All of these coordination issues must be resolved if the military team is to function at a high level. The issues are equally complex in coordinating the management team with the other pillars.

In the view of aid agencies, the military should take several steps in improving coordination with the other pillars. First, the other pillars should be involved in planning, giving them a chance to buy into the operation at the outset. To do this, the military must establish contact with NGOs as early as possible in planning and upon arrival on the ground. This coordination must be maintained all the while the military is in the area of the operations and perhaps even beyond. The military should incorporate NGO operations in military school curriculum, and include NGOs in doctrine development. The mechanisms for coordination should be formalized. Finally, the military should preposition equipment afloat that will aid in missions with other pillars.<sup>65</sup> All of these points have merit and are consistent with the **systems approach** to improving peace operation.

Lastly, the British offer some good insight into how to improve unity of effort. The British identified the need for a campaign plan providing a blueprint for integrating military and civilian efforts including NGOs. Next, the military should cross-attach officers to work with civilian agencies like UNHCR, in or out of uniform, to provide the agencies with direct military expertise and to improve interagency coordination. This also benefits military in learning how other agencies think and act. Staff procedures developed by alliances (like NATO) give an advantage to an ad hoc staff. A similar manifestation of this uniformity of procedures would be

to stack a team a headquarters with officers who speak the same language or are experienced with similar operational backgrounds.<sup>66</sup> The US with its lack of language trained officers is at a disadvantage in a multinational headquarters unless the language of the mission is English. Even then, the US is at a disadvantage socially which has professional repercussions. The fact that the social and professional aspects of a peace operation is consistent with the constructs of systems theory as they have been presented in this monograph.

This chapter has explored how several **learning disabilities** found in Senge's work manifest themselves in a peace operations environment. Chapter Three contains the conclusions derived from the findings of this chapter.

### Chapter Three: Conclusions

Unity of effort can be achieved by the military working in cooperation with the other pillars of the peace operations environment. These other pillars are military partners, NGOs, the UN, parties to the conflict, politicians, media, VIPs and regional powers. To achieve unity of effort, and success in peace operations, the military must change its approach. This change entails looking at more than just military considerations. By using a creative approach, in this case Peter Senge's model of **systems thinking and the learning organization**, the military will be better prepared for the challenges of peace operations.

This monograph maintains that the military is only one part of the peace operations environment, and not always the centerpiece. In addition, peace operations occur simultaneously at the tactical, operational and strategic level. This holds true for military, diplomatic, economic, informational and political components. Some of the agencies in a peace operation want the military to isolate itself and provide only security or logistic support. The US military has favored this isolation, but this is self defeating. This monograph maintains that the military must look at the non military aspects of peace operations for all concerned to be mutually successful and to anticipate changes in the peace operations environment.

US Army doctrine has correctly identified that there is a good way to achieve unity of effort: use of the CMOC. Success can not be achieved solely by the CMOC. Though the US Army's recent experience has shown the need for liaison, and doctrine has noted its importance in passing, the requirement for dispatching liaison officers, remains unresourced. In order to make the CMOC and liaison work, commanders must augment these efforts with interpersonal relationships with his colleagues and frequent formal and informal meetings. This will help the

commander to understand that peace operations are systems. He must evaluate which other pillars are critical to his mission success, and establish systems where these key forces can contribute to the mutual benefit of all involved. Commanders must, as Senge maintains, move from the old fashioned "cavalry version of heroic leadership" which focuses on events to one that focuses on managing systems.<sup>67</sup>

Further, commanders must constantly revise the **mental models** they hold for the non-military pillars in a peace operation. There is much that can be learned from other pillars, they hold the keys to branches and sequels since every pillar of a peace operation contributes to the operation's maturity. A commander must understand that the systems present in peace operations are critical sources of early warning information that the environment is changing. Understanding the environments created by the other pillars is a critical element in ensuring that mission creep does not occur.

Mission creep is a poor excuse used to explain an inability to properly identify sequels and branches to plans. If one only looks at the military component, one will miss indicators of changes in the overall environment that will effect military operations. If one understands the entire peace operations environment, one can understand how to identify sequels and branches before they occur. One needs the help of other pillars to understand the environment, for both situational and systemic awareness.

To deal with changes caused by the complexity of peace operations, commanders must continually plan. Planning is the basis of constant effective action.<sup>68</sup> However, many of the other pillars of a peace operation are poor planners, and the military may become frustrated by the lack of planning and by the differing leadership styles. A commander can still bend

conditions to his will, but this does not mean the military should try to direct the efforts of other pillars. Rather, a commander must help shape a **shared vision**. He does not lead other pillars, he works with them shaping systems that enable success to occur

The universal determinants of war are: the nature and the appropriate effect desired, the means available and opposed, the characteristics of the theater of operations, and the consequences of the cost. While the universal determinants of war<sup>69</sup> apply equally to peace operations, the way a commander translates the determinants to his particular situation will be the measure of his effectiveness. The cast and the techniques may change, but the substance of shaping the environment for success does not, whether it is peace or war, commanders must do this relentlessly, not dictatorially.

In sum, this monograph maintains:

-The US military has several **learning disabilities** which inhibit it from achieving unity of effort. Other pillars, likewise, possess their own that inhibit the overall success of a peace operation.

-Organizational cultures are different for the various groups participating in a peace operation (pillars). **Mental models** provide a vehicle to understand the many pillars and their complex interaction. Commanders can use **mental models** to help shape the environment.

-No one pillar will be overall in charge of the operation in the military sense of being in charge. Commanders need to identify key forces and agencies that can provide leverage required for success, and work with these key forces, yet not ignore other pillars that are less key.

-Peace operations occur simultaneously from the tactical to the operational to the strategic levels. Many organizations do not have operational level capabilities and many pillars have only limited flexibility at the tactical level.

-Many information stovepipes within a peace operation limit cooperation. Commanders must take the initiative to develop horizontal communication with the other pillars of the peace operation.

-The Media and VIPs play a key role in shaping perceptions of the operation, can cut through information stovepipes, and can be keys to mission success.

-There are limits to what the military can achieve by itself in a peace operation. Military solutions are rarely comprehensive.

-Military reliance on force, or on solely military solutions, works contrary to the concept of a **shared vision**. There is much the military can learn from the other pillars, especially to identify mission creep. The military should include non-military agencies in the campaign plan, while recognizing it does not have command authority over the other pillars.

-Coordination conducted at the CMOC and liaison with all the pillars of the peace operation are not enough. Commanders also need a social rapport, personal networking and mutual respect for their colleagues from the other pillars. The resulting dialogue helps identify branches and sequels and will prevent mission creep.

-The US military's obsession with force protection inhibits its ability to conduct peace operations, and invites attack. Commanders must establish an environment where the pillars of a peace operation can mutually support each others concerns. Systems and rapport are the key to success.

The US military, in cooperation with the other key pillars, must identify the end state that provides a comprehensive solution to the situation, not just the military solution. They must identify phases enroute to the end state for each pillar. This constitutes the campaign plan. It requires more than just military expertise to identify the systems for all the parts of the environment for each phase of the operation. Campaign planning requires inviting critical representatives from each pillar to participate in the planning for each phase. This is not the job of the military alone. The military, because of expertise in planning, may be called on to coordinate the effort, or to identify what efforts of the other key forces are necessary for success. If a commander takes the long view on this, it is in his interest to have cooperation in planning. He can gain a **shared vision** of the conditions he hope to set.

The military can not direct the efforts of the other members of the environment. Operations must be done in partnership. The approach must not be directive, but collegial. Other actors may even defer leadership to the military component. But, it will take inter-agency and international cooperation to establish all the systems needed for success.

Appendix: **I am my position and the enemy is out there**: the UN, NGOs, the Red Cross and the Department of State.

This appendix elaborates on the discussion of the learning disabilities **I am my position** and **the enemy is out there** begun in Chapter Two. The United Nations, NGOs, the Red Cross and the US Department of State all manifest these **learning disabilities** to some degree. In each case it is the organizational structure of these entities that facilitates the learning disabilities. Commanders must understand the nature of these pillars of peace operations in order to shape an environment where horizontal communication can be facilitated. The first pillar to be examined is the United Nations.

In a typical UN peace operations mission there will be multiple chains of command based upon functions. The military has one chain of command subordinate to the force commander, but the military is only one of many chains of commands. The force commander is theoretically in command of the military blue berets, but in fact contributing nations maintain some control.

Neither the US nor any other power is likely to allow their forces to join a multinational peace operation and cut their ties to the national command structure and political agenda. [such was] The experience in Somalia, where national groups maintained dual chains of command and multiple agendas predominated.<sup>70</sup>

Normally, there is a civilian, such as the Special Representative of the Secretary General (SRSG) overseeing the entire UN operation, to include the military. He will have authority over the military chain of command, the political counselor's office (called Civil Affairs by the UN), UN bureaucrats who handle administration (under the Chief Administrative Officer) and perhaps others like civilian police monitors or human rights monitors. Each of these subordinates have separate reporting stovepipes and broad powers only nominally under the control of the SRSG.

For example, the UN civilian administrators have great power over the operation since they control all the UN funding.<sup>71</sup> As Canadian Major General Alain Forrand wrote:

It is the bureaucrat against the operator. The bureaucrat has effective control over the operation because he has control over the budget. But he has no orientation to the mission. . . Nevertheless, not all the faults lie with the UN's civilian bureaucracy. Those of us in the military must also bear some of the responsibility. Firstly, we must recognize that not all military organizations are efficient, professional institutions. There are examples of military leaders who have been inept, incompetent and corrupt. Some of the bureaucratic rules are in place because of this. We have to overcome this problem if relationships are to improve.<sup>72</sup>

Further, the SRSG does not have any control over some UN agencies operating in the mission area. There are several other agencies in the operational area that do not report to the SRSG, let alone the military, and may feel no requirement to even coordinate operations.




figure 3

The UN has four line agencies: the UN High Commissioner for Refugees, (UNHCR), The UN International Children's Education Fund (UNICEF), the World Food Program, (WFP), and the UN Development Program, (UNDP). There is also the Department of Humanitarian Affairs (DHA), part of the Secretary General's Staff. (All of these UN entities will have modest staffs compared to the military.) DHA's purpose is to get the agencies to cooperate "to the extent that any of the four UN agencies wish to be coordinated."<sup>73</sup>

The four line agencies, resembling feudal baronies only nominally report to the Secretary General. They are in fact quite independent of the Secretary General, and of each other, obtaining their resources and political support from donor countries whose representatives sit on their independent governing boards. They do not report to the

General Assembly in any managerially significant way, nor do they get policy guidance from it. In Somalia the field directors of these agencies reported to their headquarters, not to the director of UN humanitarian operations located in Somalia.<sup>74</sup>

If these agencies are inclined to cooperate there are four models for coordination. A lead agency can be in charge, but only leads based on the consent of the others. A new agency can be constructed for the emergency. The UNDP country director can act as coordinator, but his focus is what the military would consider post conflict operations. Further, "UNDP's lack of experience, or interest, in complex emergencies has made this traditional model unappealing if not dysfunctional."<sup>75</sup> Finally, DHA can lead, but the barons of the various agencies sometimes are reluctant to cooperate. This is changing, but slowly, and may never be accomplished.

In an address to the UN General Assembly, Ambassador Albright stated that the UN needed to become more "more efficient and professional in coordinating its disaster relief programs."<sup>76</sup> In order to become more efficient, in 1972 the UN established The UN Disaster Relief Organization (UNDRO), but it failed to improve coordination, eliminate duplication and put someone clearly in charge. In 1991, the UN established DHA to do the same job and gave it additional political and economic development tasks. Ambassador Albright committed the US to helping DHA succeed, and that is one of the reason it has had some success. The US has leverage within the UN because of the money it commits (and pays, usually late) and the number of states it is able to influence. Ambassador Albright recognized that:

The international relief system is under grave strain. We should respond by strengthening DHA and by emphasizing the kind of comprehensive approach that complex emergencies demand. We must also work together to overcome the obstacles created by political and military conflict to the delivery of emergency relief.<sup>77</sup>

Despite recognition of the problems the UN faces, Ambassador Albright, and the US with all its leverage, has not been able to achieve UN-wide cooperation and the development of clear areas of responsibility and coordination. In explaining the lack of coordination by the several UN agencies sent to Central America, two senior UN officials described the relationships:

Basic Flaws in the international community's mechanisms for dealing with . . . complex situations have aggravated domestic problems. The adjustment program and the stabilization plan, on the one hand, and the peace process, on the other, were born and reared as if they were children of different families. They lived under separate roofs. They had little in common other than belonging roughly to the same family. . . . It was as if a patient lay on the operation table with the left and right sides of his body separated by a curtain and unrelated surgery being performed on each side. . . . The current system of international organizations does not lend itself easily to cogent and integrated action. Each of the different agencies has its own charter, budget, and governing body. The governing body is usually controlled by the ministry or government department that is its main constituency . . . the difference between the agencies and the ministries is that the latter are under the authority of a head of government who is usually able to arbitrate territorial disputes and ensure uniformity of policy. No such central authority exists in the multi-lateral [international organizations's] system.<sup>78</sup>

It is understandable that US military commanders on the ground will be unable to assert command over UN organizations in the field since not even the Secretary General can achieve integrated action. Many Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) also believe the UN has problems. The main problems for UN peace operations forces to overcome in the eyes of the NGOs are:

They have poorly defined mandate. . . . National contingents have an inability to maintain the same standard of behavior. . . . This damages credibility for all not just the peace forces. . . . There is great inertia in UN bureaucracy. . . . Cooperation is long overdue. . . . Expectations of what the UN can do are too high.<sup>79</sup>

Expectations of what the UN can do are about what they should be if the UN had the required physical and intellectual resources, and the authority to conduct its assigned tasks, however, the

UN does not. The UN military planner must be careful of the mandate and the ROE devised for a mission. These present the structures that drive the soldiers's behavior. They should not be changed unless the soldier has sufficient time to train for the new ROE.<sup>80</sup> Rather they should be designed with flexibility in mind.

Despite the problems, the UN must continue to try to achieve its objectives. To do this UN efforts in peace operations are organized to address a range of tasks. The main functions are: continue negotiating, provide relief, restore the civil administration of the host nation, maintain security. These functions are the only glue that binds the UN together.

Although all the functional elements have separate roles, implicitly at a strategic level, all have the same long-term objectives. . . . Coordination across the elements of the force [civilian agencies included] would be easier if UN structures and procedures existed for that purpose. However, so far in every force the staff has had to improvise agreements and as hoc meetings to bring together the strands of different activities into a single strategy with a common purpose. The plan thus achieved is then reinterpreted at a lower level in each district by a similarly convened group representing the essential elements of the force.<sup>81</sup>

The structure of the UN, with its many stovepipes, limits its ability to cooperate internally. Only when elements in the field agree to cooperate is there lateral communication and a modicum of unity of effort. Senge would argue the design of the organizations, structures their interaction, and drives their independent and inefficient behavior.<sup>82</sup>

The **mental model** for the US military commander on the ground should recognize that the UN is a very diverse organization that is not under any one person's, country's or groups control. Commanders must recognize that the representatives from the various UN agencies are independent, and neither take orders from the military force commander, nor issues them. The agencies should first be considered for their value as key forces. Next, they should be

considered for how these agencies can directly and indirectly affect the overall success of the operation. It is the indirect effect that is most dangerous. Since commanders can not control these agencies, but the work of these agencies has an effect, a prudent commander would be well advised to keep tabs on the agencies operating in the area. Commanders are responsible to insure that they are not caught off guard. Changes in the environment of the other pillars could be the que that the rest of the peace operation could be affected. Left unidentified, these changes become mission creep.

In identifying key forces beyond the UN, commanders will have a wide range of organizations from which to choose. Many of whom have the same learning disabilities already discussed. Usually categorized as Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) or Private Voluntary Organizations (PVOs), they serve several functions in a peace operation and beyond. NGOs are international, usually not for profit agencies that provide relief, assistance, development and monitoring to further certain humanitarian principles.<sup>83</sup> PVO is a term used only by US personnel and normally refers to an NGO whose primary base of support stems from the private sector. NGOs are extremely diverse and wield great influence:

Environmentalists, human rights activists, women, children, animal rights advocates, consumers, the disabled, gays, and indigenous peoples have all gone international, following the example set long ago by religious denominations and the labor movement. These groups have developed distinct agendas at the global level and at the form of non-governmental organizations they are working with increasing sophistication to further these interests in international institutions. . . . These organizations are backed not only by moral authority but also by the capacity to spur large and influential segments of the public to action at the international level, through both national and international institutions.<sup>84</sup>

There are countless numbers of NGOs; the Union of International Organizations has 14,500 international NGOs of which 5,000 have membership structures.<sup>85</sup> In Somalia the US military

had to deal with more than 70 NGOs, in Operation Provide Comfort there were more than 20. The UN Economic and Social Council (ECOCOC) allows some larger and more powerful NGOs to participate in some activities, but on the whole, the UN is ill equipped to keep track of the 1,000 NGOs that have consultive status.<sup>86</sup>

Commanders must be aware that NGOs will be operating in the area, and must also understand that NGOs have power and may not be willing to cooperate with the military. NGOs have great influence on the US population and the US government because of their ability to influence perceptions and engender emotional responses. In a peace operation, a commander should prepare **mental models** for each NGO individually. They are all unique, and may have misconceptions about the military, just as the military does of them.

Despite the experience and proven effectiveness of both groups, relations between NGOs and the military are often strained, the result of misunderstood modus operandi, preconceived biases, and inherent cultural differences. . . . Some view NGOs as incompetent, antimilitary 'do gooders' out to 'save the world' who show up without the requisite capabilities, and who get in the military's way. . . . NGOs, on the other hand, often view the military as inflexible, overly bureaucratic gunslingers who would rather use force than save lives. At times, they have unrealistic expectations about what the military can do, such as running all the 'bad guys' away, disarming a populace, and responding to a constant stream of transportation requests. They often presume the military is there to serve their every need and they often openly flout military priorities like security and the well-being of the troops.<sup>87</sup>

The individuals in NGOs run the gamut from those who sought an exciting change from the cooperate grind, to former military personnel (especially former special forces personnel). Some are very liberal and others, for example Catholic Relief Services's personnel, are usually conservative.

. . . the US military and American PVOs are un-alike in every important way. Indeed, it's difficult to imagine two more dissimilar cultures. The former is highly disciplined, hierachal, politically and culturally conservative, tough, with a mission to defeat the

enemy. By and large, American PVOs are independent, resistant to authority, politically and culturally liberal (with the exception of some Christian PVOs) sensitive and understanding, with a mission to save lives. Because military missions tend to be explicit and tangible, the military sometimes misses the mark on humanitarian mission statements where objectives can be implicit and intangible.<sup>88</sup>

One extreme example of an aid worker is that of a "Terry," described by Peter Kieseker in Peacekeeping: Challenges for the Future:

Terry belongs to the left wing of aid . . . A man searching for meaning in his life, he expressed his journey by wearing orange robes, chanting, meditating and practicing yoga for many hours a day. French by nationality, he had adopted this Indian-based organization as his spiritual home. A celibate, vegetarian monk who was called dadda (brother) by his staff, he enjoyed the power of aid work -- and it can be a power kick to save lives and be seen as the great benefactor.<sup>89</sup>

Eric Hoffer in his book, The True Believer, describes individuals who zealously take part in certain endeavors.<sup>90</sup> Personnel in humanitarian aid agencies, like many military personnel, and others in the peace operations environment, meet the criteria of true believers. Terry, fortunately, is one of the more extreme examples. Devising a **mental model** for Terry might not be difficult. But for the mass of NGOs things are not so clear. Kieseker also describes an aid worker who was a former member of a Special Air Service (SAS) Unit, and another who was a young Irish nurse. Kieseker adds that "Just as not all soldiers are gun-toting cowboys, nor are all aid workers 'bleeding hearts.' In most cases both are professionals."<sup>91</sup> With such diversity it is hard to have one **mental model** of NGOs. But what a commander must do is **model** those NGOs who could have an impact on his mission and strive to cooperate. NGOs are in the area of operations before the military, will remain after the military is gone, and have a right to be there.

According to many NGOs, the military is often arrogant, thinking that only the military is able to understand the situation, especially the security situation. NGOs are on the ground

before the military and may be there after the military. The military sometimes does not appreciate that looks can be deceiving or that looks do not matter. The NGOs have information and experience that are of value to the military. The military should not, according to Kiesecker, try to pretend that they know everything. The military should consult NGOs, and collaborate with them.<sup>92</sup> Arrogance is by no means confined to the military. Some NGOs believe that there is currently a golden age of humanitarian workers, that aid workers are romantic figures:

The age of 'French doctors' rapidly replaced that of heroes in the mould of Che Guevera - - the latter more romantic, undoubtably, but disqualified by reason of their enthusiasm for gulags. The humanitarian volunteer, a new, newsworthy figure, neither statesman nor guerrilla, but half-amateur and half expert, began to appear at the flash points which light up the progress of history. Both actor and narrator, he has taken over where politics stopped, playing the front man with a sense of reality which he can reduce to a common denominator - the victim and the treatment he will be receiving. - which immediately upstages any other social imagery expressed in the same terms.<sup>93</sup>

Clearly, arrogance is not solely a military domain as evidenced by this quote. One must ask, how can a mere soldier consider himself the equal of a humanitarian Che Guevera? Perhaps the best way to cooperate is to establish dialogue. The best means to achieve this dialogue is to use the Civil Military Operations Center (CMOC), establish liaison, use frequent meetings, and establish a social atmosphere based on interpersonal interaction and networking.

One question that often arises in peace operations is how much and what type of support should the military provide to civilians. As seen earlier, the US military prefers to stay within the martial domain. In Haiti, and elsewhere, the US was guilty of **the delusion of learning from experience** because of its **fixation on events** and short term objectives.

US peace operations doctrine maintains a key principle is perseverance. This is often violated in favor of short term (one rotation) success. Commanders want to get out of the

mission area with no casualties, regardless of their long term contribution, or lack of contribution. This does not further the US strategic goals. The short term view is appropriate if the commanders have a campaign plan to cover those areas that can not be solved in a sequenced rotation. There may be a need to carry over responsibilities from one task force to its replacement. Commanders must recognize that there is only a brief "Honeymoon Period" as described by Ernest Evans.<sup>94</sup> He wrote that the military will be welcomed initially, but, if results don't appear quickly (or results are not as high as expected) the military will become unpopular. Commanders must be prepared for the population to become hostile if it perceives the military is being recalcitrant in making visible achievements. The military must span the pillars with its planning, and span the entire campaign through several rotations, until end state.

In contrast to the American piecemeal approach, the Australians in Somalia took the long view. They did not see themselves merely protecting those distributing aid, they thought they were building a country. This was more appropriate to what they were doing and also more interesting for the diggers.<sup>95</sup> The Australian position is consistent with **systems thinking** and overcoming the **learning disability of the delusion of learning from experience**. This is addressed by many authors Andrew Natsios wrote:

The military should not attempt to replace or dominate humanitarian organizations, nor should it be directed to undertake nation-building activities. Projects such as port and road reconstruction, which the military sometimes undertakes as part of its own transportation requirement, should be of short duration and sustainable without its ongoing attention.<sup>96</sup>

Natsios is urging the military to take a **systems approach**, but not to undertake efforts that are better conducted by other pillars. He understands that the military may have to undertake projects for its own needs that will have second order advantages to the population.

He is partially incorrect because he separates the military from the overall environment. Unlike the Australians who realized they were part of the whole, Natsios wants to isolate the pillars in the nation building effort. Natsios is too concerned with guarding territory and fails to understand that the borders between pillars are not concrete. He wrote:

The most important capabilities the military brings to any emergency response remain logistics and security: They are tasks that relief organizations can never match, but increasingly need in complex emergencies. When the military focuses on what it does best, it serves well; when it is required to do nation building and development, complex disciplines about which it knows relatively little, it can do more harm than good.<sup>97</sup>

He is correct, the military has great capabilities, but these are not limited to logistics and security. The military can contribute with its intellectual capacities as well as its physical capabilities. The proper position is to find how the military and other organizations can compliment each other, and also to mutually support each other. The pillars must not only focus on pieces of the environment, lest they end up with only parts of the elephant, not the whole, as described earlier. Some NGOs may never choose to work with the military, hopefully these NGOs will not be among the key forces needed for success. NGOs sometimes cooperate with each other, but this is rare. Their mandates may limit them on the ground, thus limiting cooperation. Additionally, if they cooperate they lose a certain amount of independence which could effect their base constituency. One NGO that has a very secure base constituency and firm rules for operations is the Red Cross.

The Red Cross is a complex organization and its behavior is based upon its structure. The Red Cross is familiar to most military personnel. Indeed, nearly every Post will have a Red Cross office. This office is a branch of the American Red Cross, America's national Red Cross society. Nearly every country in the world has a Red Cross or Red Crescent (Islamic countries)

Society. These national societies provide emergency relief, health services, social assistance, first aid classes and other related health programs based solely on need. In war, the societies assist military medical personnel in caring for the wounded, prisoners, civilian internees, and refugees. All societies must be recognized by the Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies, formerly the League of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies.

The Federation, as it is now called, has the mission to alleviate suffering through the work of the national societies. The Federation promotes the creation of societies around the world, It aids new societies in developing capabilities. It coordinates relief from various Red Crosses, and other contributors, for relief of victims of natural disasters and refugees. The Federation also assists national societies in developing national disaster plans.<sup>98</sup> There are minimum standards that the National Red Crosses must meet to remain certified. This can be a problem in nations where the government, or an interest group, provides the majority of funding. Because the Red Cross is so zealous about its neutrality and that all aid is given solely on need and not politics, it has had a hard time adjusting to the new complex emergencies.

Complex emergencies will feature two parts of the Red Cross movement, the Federation and the International Committee of the Red Cross. The Federation in a peace operations area will normally consist of a small group of humanitarians who are responsible to distribute aid, establish an institution, or provide some training. They will be from an outside national society (US, Britain, Finland, etc), or societies, and be under the loose direction of the Head of Mission. The Head of Mission is diplomatic rank, equivalent to an Ambassador. The Head of Mission oversees the operation for the Federation, including insuring that the local Red Cross is neutral and equitable in dispensing assistance. The second element of the Movement in a peace

operations area is the International Committee of the Red Cross.

The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) is unique among NGOs. Its uniqueness is based upon its long history, its ethos of neutrality and its legitimacy. The ICRC is composed mainly of Swiss nationals. The Committee itself is 25 Swiss individuals, with a Geneva headquarters staff of 600. It has some 600 (mostly Swiss) delegates working with 2,500 local employees around the world. The ICRC reflects its Swiss heritage by being neutral, organized, and disciplined. This organization and discipline has strict mandates and elaborate systems of rules which do not leave much room for initiative in the field.<sup>99</sup>

The ICRC acts as a neutral intermediary in humanitarian matters during international conflicts, civil wars and internal disturbances. It provides protection and assistance to both military and civilian victims - to prisoners of war and civilian detainees, to the war wounded and to civilian populations in occupied or enemy territory, it also visits political detainees.<sup>100</sup>

Its mandates are set out in the Geneva Conventions. Thus, its existence is legitimized by treaty.

In the myriad of humanitarian organizations, the ICRC stands out. Its specific status stems from several factors. First of all, the ICRC has been entrusted with a mandate by the states party to the Geneva Conventions of 1949, in other words, virtually every country in the world. . . . Secondly, the same states, in approving the adoption of the Statutes of the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement, pledged to respect at all times the ICRC's obligation to act in accordance with Fundamental principles of the Movement. . . . Finally, the ICRC's impartiality is the fruit of a tradition and is expressed through its policy guidelines, which ensure continuity in its actions and safeguard States against unpredictable reactions on its part. The ICRC thus enjoys a special status which the international community recognized when, on 16 October 1990, it granted the institution a seat as an observer at the United Nations.<sup>101</sup>

Unfortunately, the peace operations environment is not composed solely of nation states. Many belligerent parties will recognize neither the legitimacy of the ICRC, nor its neutrality. This new environment has created problems for the ICRC. For the first time in its history the ICRC had to use guards. This was in Somalia, where, despite putting its emblem on everything

in sight, it was a target.<sup>102</sup> Once the Red Cross could rely upon its emblem for protection, now that is not enough. This new operational environment has caused the ICRC to evaluate what role it wants the military to take. In contradiction to an integrated systems approach, the ICRC wants the military to do as the elite 10th Mountain Division recommends, don't mix the missions.

In a speech to the North Atlantic Assembly's Rose-Roth Seminar that reflects the ICRC perspective on cooperation, the ICRC Delegate to Western and Central Europe, Thierry Germond, said:<sup>103</sup>

In the ICRC's view, developments in the situation in Bosnia-Herzegovina . . . demonstrate the absolute need for humanitarian action to be allowed to maintain its autonomy. The prevailing tendency to link humanitarian work, political action and peace-keeping operations, or even to make them interdependent, can only weaken each of these three components of action taken by the international community to deal with conflict. Humanitarian work and political action have their own individual dynamics. The aim of political action by states is to resolve the underlying causes of the differences opposing parties to a conflict and to maintain peace and international security. That responsibility also involves ensuring compliance with international humanitarian law. Merging humanitarian and political objectives by adopting an identical approach to both or associating them in the same negotiation process will only politicize humanitarian action and consequently change its very nature. Humanitarian work must on no account be perceived as an instrument at the service of political action. On the contrary, political action taken by states must provide unconditional support for humanitarian endeavor.

Blaming the failure of humanitarian relief operations in complex situations on the presence of the military highlights the **learning disability the enemy is out there**. The other **learning disability** discussed earlier, **I am my position**, is equally well manifested in the Mr Germond's testimony of how the ICRC thinks. Mr Germond's theory is based upon a poorly constructed **mental model**. It flies in the face of a **systems approach** to peace operations. His position is based on a dubious assumption that humanitarian work can be cut away from the other pillars of

the environment. Further, he says that the use of the military implies political considerations, while that of humanitarian intervention does not. How does Mr Germond reconcile himself to the efforts of governmental aid agencies like USAid, whose main purpose is to supply resources in support of diplomatic and political objectives? Also, The Federation receives much of its funds in the form of grants from governments.<sup>104</sup> In classic war between two powers who will respect the obligations of the Geneva Convention, Mr Germond's theory can work based on consent. In the environment of most peace operations, however, the political ends can not be separated from the diplomatic, humanitarian, economic, and military means. The belligerents may not be states, much less signatories to the Geneva convention. Nations usually become involved for political purposes. Even the Nordic nations's notion of being moral superpowers connotes a political imperative. Aid workers may still be attacked, and the question of their security is still a concern to their government. The ICRC defines itself by being an independent and neutral organization. Independence is a difficult tenet to achieve in a complex environment where all the entities interact and effect each other. The ICRC thinks it can be independent and fill an important niche.

Keen to avoid duplicating efforts, the ICRC has sought its own way, dictated by its specific role as a neutral, independent and impartial organization. This specific role is a great asset, but also a necessary constraint, obliging it to maintain a certain resolve which people sometimes find hard to understand when passions are running high.<sup>105</sup>

The commander on the ground may identify the ICRC as a key force required for mission success. If so, he will have to strive for a **shared vision**. To do this the commander find common ground, similar objectives, or a common objective. If lost for a place to start, have the ICRC representative give soldiers Geneva Convention Training. This could be the start point for

dialogue. From this dialogue can spring the inter-personal relationship that is the key to inter-bureaucracy coordination at every level.

Another complex system which is both present in a peace operation and exhibits the first two **learning disabilities**, but to a much lesser degree, is the US diplomatic system. Rather than a united effort focused on a single policy objective, the diplomatic element of national power is complex, diverse and suffers from interagency conflicts. The inter-agency diplomatic effort is led by Foreign Service Officers (FSOs). It includes political appointees, local nationals, and other executive departments, not the least of which is the military. The Foreign Service has five officer departments: State, Commerce, Agriculture, Agency for International Development (AID), and the US Information Agency (USIA), and amounts to a total of 4,000 FSOs around the world. AID is an independent agency whose work is closely related to mother State, and whose staff is closely aligned with the State Department. USIA is a part of the State Department, whose officers normally serve as the press officers for diplomatic efforts as well as running American Libraries, Cultural Centers and managing the Voice of America and other information programs.

The Foreign Service is a fraternity of sorts to its members. A FSO is more likely to say 'I'm in the Foreign Service' than 'I work for the State Department. . . . Charged generally with implementing US foreign policy overseas, much of a FSOs duties can be summed up as 'observe and report.' And report they do, sending to Washington hundreds of thousands of cables (messages) annually, reporting on political economic and similar developments, large and small, in the host country. Information is obtained by sifting local newspapers and other publications, and making daily contact with host government officials, the local business community and ordinary citizens. . . .<sup>106</sup>

These 4,000 FSOs, when abroad, are normally part of a US diplomatic mission. These can be called an embassy, consulate, mission, interests office (in nations where we do not have

diplomatic relations), or in some areas our only diplomatic representation is a cultural center run by USIA. The leader of a diplomatic mission is normally an Ambassador. Ambassador is a diplomatic rank, similar to general. The duty position is Head of Mission; some missions may have several Ambassadors, but only one Head of Mission. Some embassies may not have anyone of Ambassador rank, rather the senior diplomat may be a Charge d'affaires, who holds the rank of minister or commissioner. Many Ambassadors are political appointees, one of the last vestiges of the spoils system. Some are career diplomats. Technically the Head of Mission reports directly to the President, but in some cases the Ambassadors may not have the required political connections. Though the senior US representative to a country, they do not always get their way in conflicts with regional commanders. In an area where there is a sizable military presence, the senior military commander would be well advised to determine what value the White House puts on the input of the Ambassador. Conflicts between military commanders and Ambassadors are not always resolved in the Ambassador's favor. The Ambassador may have structural command, but rarely does he have command as we know it in the military. Diplomats and the other agencies often have agency agendas the Ambassador can not affect.

Within the mission, duties are divided functionally. The combat arms officers of a mission, in terms of power and prestige, are the political and economic officers. The senior officer is the counselor or attachee, his deputy is the first secretary and the next level is second secretary. Besides political and economic sections, there are administrative, consular, public affairs and other sections. One of these, the Regional Security Officer (RSO) will often have detailed threat evaluations available. Also, he supervises the security program for the embassy. The Marine Security Guards (MSG) are under the supervision of the RSO. MSGs are always

under the control of the mission Ambassador and are often augmented by local hire guards. Besides the local hire guards, the embassy will employ local nationals (Foreign Service Nationals - FSNs) for administrative, supply and services support. Communications, secretarial, and other technical duties will be performed by US national administrative and technical staff. Some of the embassy staff may also be officers or employees of any of a number of executive departments. The Department of Defense (DOD) is represented by the Defense Attachee (DATT) and perhaps, some form of Security Assistance Office (SAO). All these parts to the embassy are called the country team.

Overseas a rivalry and tension exists between FSOs and their military counterparts similar to that between the White House and the Pentagon. One commentator explains that FSOs are more apt to regard US military "... activities abroad as alien and unwelcome intrusions than as a viable adjunct to American Diplomacy."<sup>107</sup> Some feel this way but most treat the military with reciprocal professional respect. FSOs are like military in that they have an up or out system, reward field work more than work in Washington, and have similar problems, like safety, when overseas.

In many ways, the Country Team is a microcosm of what it represents-an assortment of entrenched Washington bureaucratic institutions steeped in the art of turf warfare. Self-interest has been known to surface. What tends to prevail in the end though is a conviction among the Teams's members that they are in fact a team, the Ambassador is the coach calling the plays, and it is their duty to run in the same direction as their teammates. They may seek adjustments at the margins, but they remain on the team and on the field.<sup>108</sup>

The State Department, when the country team goes from reporting to acting, is one example of a multi-agency effort that overcomes the limits found so often in peace operations. By no means perfect, the country team has the potential to serve as a model for peace operation

unity of effort. State has put diplomats in the form of Political Advisors (POLADS) in several key commands, and every regional Unified Command as well as most NATO headquarters. POLADS can facilitate the cooperation between the military and the State Department.

In addition to embassy personnel, commanders may get to work with AID officers, especially members of Disaster Assistance Response Teams (DART). Somewhat redundantly referred to in the field as DART teams, they consist of several experts who identify what needs in the area can be addressed by AID resources. These experts include logisticians, medical specialist, information officers, and engineers. Once dispatched to an area, their reports often form the basis for the US inter-agency crisis response. Sometimes military officers are included with DART teams. DART teams and the diplomatic country team, when properly constructed, are the closest the US inter-agency effort comes to overcoming the bureaucratic isolation of the first two **learning disabilities** and serves as a model for military planning.

This annex has looked at the **mental models** and how two **learning disabilities** apply to the UN, NGOs, the Red Cross, the Department of State; and the US military. In order to overcome the barriers between these institutions and to fashion systems that will insure success, commanders must go beyond the CMOC and liaison and establish inter-personal rapport to develop a shared vision.

1. Peace operations consist of the missions of peacekeeping - military operations undertaken with the consent of all the major belligerent, designed to monitor and facilitate implementation of an existing truce or cease fire and support diplomatic efforts to reach a long term solution, peace making - the process of diplomacy, mediation negotiation, or other forms of peaceful settlements that arranges an end to a dispute and resolve issues that led to conflict, peace enforcement - the application of military force, or the threat of force normally pursuant to international authorization to compel compliance with resolutions or sanctions designed to maintain or restore peace and peace building - the post-conflict operations, primarily diplomatic and economic, that strengthen and rebuild governmental infrastructure and institutions in order to avoid a relapse into conflict. There are, in fact, no universally recognized definitions for these terms. The US Army doctrinal definitions are contained in US Army Field Manual 101-5-1, Operational Terms and Graphics (Final Draft), dated 15 July 1995. These definitions are based upon the definitions contained in Boutros Boutros-Ghali's seminal work: An Agenda For Peace, (New York: United Nations Department of Public Information, 1992). Boutros Boutros-Ghali also authored An Agenda For Development, which complements An Agenda For Peace, reading both provides a systemic approach to potential, future United Nations actions. In this monograph, the definitions above are the ones intended. Peace Operations, the term used most often in this monograph, includes a wide variety of missions which entail different mandates and ROE. However, this variety of missions neither effects the requirements for the military to adopt new ways of thinking, nor the applicability of systems thinking, since the military is not the sole component of any peace operation.

2. Peter M. Senge, The Fifth Discipline: The Art and Practice of The Learning Organization (New York: Currency Doubleday, 1990), 3. "Learning organizations (are) where people continually expand their capacity to create the results they truly desire, where new and expansive patterns of thinking are nurtured, where collective aspiration is set free, and where people are continually learning how to learn together."

3. Idar Jit Rikhye, Michael Harbottle, and Bjorn Egge, The Thin Blue Line: International Peacekeeping and its Future (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1975), 289.

4. John A. Warden, The Air Campaign: Planning for Combat (Washington, D.C.: National Defense University), 10-11, 145-150.

5. Ibid., xv-xvi

6. Henry A. Kissinger, A World Restored: Metternich, Castlereagh and the Problems of Peace 1812 - 1822 (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, n. d. ), 43., in Douglas V. Johnson, and Steven Metz, American Civil Military Relations: New Issues, Enduring Problems (Carlisle Barracks: US Army War College, 24 April 1995), 19.

7. Larry Minear, and Thomas G. Weiss, Humanitarian Action in Times of War (Boulder: Lynne Reinner Publishers, 1993), 15.

8. Senge, 9.
9. Ibid., 7-8. "People with a high level of personal mastery are able to consistently realize the results that matter most deeply to them ...Personal mastery is the discipline of continually clarifying and deepening our personal vision, of focusing our energies, of developing patience and of seeing reality objectively ... it is an essential cornerstone of the learning organization -the learning organizations spiritual foundation."
10. Michael Kirby, Book Outline of the Fifth Discipline (Ft Leavenworth, KS: Unpublished, 1994), 14-15.
11. Senge, 204-220. There are several possible attitudes toward a vision:  
Commitment: when pillars are willing to create whatever structures are needed to insure success.  
Enrollment: when pillars are willing to do whatever can be done in the spirit of the law.  
Genuine compliance: when pillars see the benefits of the vision and do everything expected and more.  
Formal compliance: when pillars do everything expected, but no more.  
Grudging compliance: when pillars do what they must to avert being ostracized, and they make sure you know they "are not on board."  
Non-compliance: when pillars will not do what is expected. " I won't do it and you can't make me."  
Apathy: when pillars have no interest and no energy.
12. US Naval War College, Sound Military Decision (Newport: RI: US Naval War College, 1942), 201.
13. Andrew S. Natsios, "The International Response System," Parameters XXV (Spring, 1995): 79.
14. Senge, 7.
15. Kirby, 21.
16. The US Army has seven Battlefield Operation Systems (BOS). These are Maneuver, Intelligence, Fire Support, Air Defense, Mobility/Counter-mobility, Logistics, and Command and Control. Each of these systems are inter-related in that each has an effect on all the others; yet, each is also an independent system where sub-components interact upon each other.
17. Senge, 18.
18. William J. Doll, and Steven Metz, The Army and Multinational Peace Operations: Problems and Solutions (Carlisle Barracks: US Army War College, 29 November 1994), 17.

19. 10th Mountain Division, Briefing Prepared for the US Army War College, (Fort Drum: 10th Mountain Division, 28 February 1995).
20. D.S. Alberts and Richard E. Hayes. Command Arrangements (Washington, D.C.: 1994), 127.
21. Senge, 19 -20.
22. Natsios, 81.
23. Thomas K. Adams, "Cooperation With Non-Military Agencies and Organizations" (Ft. Leavenworth, KS: Unpublished, September, 1995).
24. US Army Joint Readiness Training Center, "NGO After Action Review of JRTC Exercise in Peace Enforcement" (Ft Polk, LA: Unpublished, November, 1993).
25. Interview with a senior officer, formerly a commander in the 10th Mountain Division.
26. Ibid.
27. US Army, Operations Other Than War: Volume IV, Peace Operations (Ft. Leavenworth, KS: US Army Center for Army Lessons Learned, December, 1993), V-5.
28. D. M. Last, and Don Vought, Interagency Cooperation in Peace Operations (Fort Leavenworth: US Army Command and General Staff College, 1994), 12.
29. Francois Jean, Life Death and Aid: The Medecins Sans Frontieres Report on World Crisis Intervention (London: Routledge, 1993), 149-158.
30. Ibid, 150.
31. Ernest Evans, "Peacekeeping: Two Views, The U.S. Military and Peacekeeping Operations," World Affairs Vol. 155, (Spring 1993) No 4: 143-147.
32. Douglas V. Johnson and Steven Metz, American Civil-Military Relations: New Issues, Enduring Problems (Carlisle Barracks, PA: US Army War College, August 1995), 9.
33. Ibid, 12.
34. Ibid.
35. Ibid, 20.
36. Gordon A. Craig, "Delbruck: The Military Historian," in Paret, Peter, The Makers of Modern Strategy: From Machiavelli to the Nuclear Age (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1986), 336.

37. Department of Defense, JP 1-02: The Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Term (Washington, D.C.: Department of Defense, 1993).

38. Last and Vought, 3.

39. Senge, 66.

40. Senge, 57.

41. Jean, viii.

42. Graeme Dobell, "The Media's Perspective on Peacekeeping," in Hugh Smith, Peacekeeping: Challenges for the Future (Canberra: Australian Defence Studies Centre, 1993), 41-59.

43. This commander also had a vigorous command information program to subvert the rampant hearsay and rumors that surrounded his operation. He maintained that this helped explain the good his operation was doing to the local population and to the US population. Ironically, by resorting to figures he failed to truly educate the US public or the local population about the true measure of what his force accomplished and failed to accomplish.

44. Senge, 333.

45. Jean, 154.

46. Minear and Weiss, 65.

47. Alberts and Hayes, 99.

48. Senge, 59.

49. For a thorough discussion of the impact of the use of force on parties to a conflict in a peace operation see Thomas Greco, A Survey of Selected Peace Operations Doctrines, and the Utility of Current US Army Peace Operations Doctrine (Ft. Leavenworth: USACGSC, 1995).

50. Sound Military Decision, 96-99.

51. Stephen Covey, Personal Leadership Application Workbook (Provo: Covey Leadership Center, 1994), 2-7.

52. John Jandora, "Threat Parameters for Operations Other Than War," Parameters Vol. XXV (Carlisle Barracks: US Army War College, Spring 1995): 55-67.

53. Peters, Ralph, "The New Warrior Class," Parameters Vol. XXIV (Carlisle Barracks: US Army War College, Summer 1994): 16-26.

54. Jean, 47.

55. The unleashing of combat power is filled with risks, however. Use of force causes a reduction of consent and will required heightened force protection. The US maintains that because we are always potential targets we must maintain a high force protection status. Raising the level of force protection can become counter productive at a certain point. See also note 49.

56. John Mackinlay, "US Forces in Operations Beyond Peacekeeping," in William Lewis, Peacekeeping the Way Ahead (Washington, D.C.: National Defense University, 1993): 32.

57. Thomas Geraci, "Overflight, Landing Rights, Customs, and Cleарances," Air Force Law Review (Washington, D.C.: USAF, 1994): 161.

58. Robert C.R. Seikmann, National Contingents in United Nations Peace-Keeping Forces (Boston: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1994), 9.

59. Indar Jit Rikhye, and Kjell Skjelsbaek, United Nations and Peacekeeping (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1991), 10 - 11.

60. Senge, 24.

61. Patrick Cronin, Standing Up Coalitions (Washington, D.C.: National Defense University, 1994), 5.

62. Ibid, 7.

63. Ibid, 9.

64. Mackinlay, 33.

65. Balbeer K. Sihra, "Relief Agencies and the US Military," Marine Corps Gazette Vol. 78, (Quantico: Marine Corps Association, March, 1994): 49.

66. Last and Vought, 15.

67. Senge, 333 and 340.

68. Sound Military Decision Making, 198.

69. Ibid., 36.

70. Alberts and Hayes, 33.

71. UN funding can work to the disadvantage of the US military. Because the UN rarely has enough money to cover all mission expenses, bureaucrats often do not buy items for the developed nations of the force. Their logic is that the developed nations will buy what is needed

for their troops if the UN does not. Poor nations who contribute troops usually can not afford uniforms and equipment if the UN does pay for the items.

72. Forrand, Alain, "Civil-Military Relations," in Peacekeeping: Challenges for the Future (Canberra: Australian Defense Studies Center, 1993), 159 - 160.

73. Natsios, 75-76.

74. Ibid.

75. Ibid.

76. Madeline Albright, "Strengthening the Coordination of Humanitarian Emergency Assistance," The DISAM Journal Vol 16 (Wright Patterson AFB: Defense Institute of Security Assistance Management, Winter 1993-94): 58-61.

12. Ibid.

78. De Soto, Alvaro and Graciana del Castillo, "Obstacles to Peace Building," Foreign Policy 94 (Spring 1994): 72.

79. Jean, 7

80. 10th Mountain Division Briefing for the US Army War College. The US military achieved the highest manifestation (perhaps the Operational Art) of peace operations in Haiti by the sequencing of forces with revised ROE for each deployment. Had the US military been able to fully incorporate the diplomatic, economic, and informational element of national power, they would have achieved the operational art. The 10th Mountain Division did an excellent job in Haiti of insuring ROE were understood, and that the ROE fit the military portion of their mission. There were discrepancies in the manner of performance of the various national contingents sent to Haiti both with the 10th Mountain and after the mission was turned over to the UN. However, the US military did meet most of the narrow standards of operational art contained JP 1-02. "The employment of military forces to attain strategic and/or operational objectives through the design, organization, integration, and conduct of campaigns, major operations or battles. Operational art translates the joint force commander's strategy into operational design, and ultimately, tactical action, by integrating the key activities at all levels of war." The issue of the attainment of the strategic or operational objectives is arguable since UN forces remain and the mission is yet to be complete. It is the premise of this paper that the strategic objective, and hence the operational art, can not be achieved solely by the military in peace operations. Not until all elements of national/international power can produce a complete settlement will a mission be a success and the operational art achieved. The fundamental flaw in the US military's **mental model** on peace operations is its failure to understand it is part of a whole.

81. John Mackinlay, "US forces in Operations Beyond Peacekeeping," in Peacekeeping: The Way Ahead (Washington: National Defense University, 1993), 34-35.
82. Senge, 40.
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